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"Productivity was the central test and validating canon."' Thus did the
late Willard Hurst, our leading historian of nineteenth-century law,
characterize the criterion by which, from the 1830s to the 1870s, Wisconsin
"confidently wielded authority over the waterways 2 of the lumbering region
that formed so vital a part of its economy. In this instance Hurst was
referring specifically to statutes and decisions that affected the operations of
a single state's extractive and processing industry, together with its use of
the public waters. But the statement conveyed accurately enough the larger
picture of American legal culture in the era, from the 1790s to the Civil
War, a picture that Hurst provided in the masterful studies-both
monographs and works of synthesis-through which he has profoundly
influenced an entire generation of legal historians' research.' In The
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I. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTHt TIlE LEGAL HISTORY OF Tilm LL tBER
INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 172 (1964).
2. Id.
3. Numerous methodological studies have analyzed Hurst's influence from a %anct, of perspecti' S
See, e.g., Robert NV. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Las Tradition it American Lgal
Historiography, 10 L. & SOC'Y REV. 9 (1975): Harry N. Scheiber. At the Borderland of Lai and Economic
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People ' Welfare,4 American historian William J. Novak pursues in great
depth and with admirable originality one of the most important themes
originally set forth by Hurst and a few other pioneers in the literature of
American history: 5 how government "confidently wielded" authority through
exercise of the police power, that is, how the state deployed regulatory power
for the protection of the public's health, safety, morals, and welfare.6
History: The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HisT. REV. 744 (1970) [hereinafter Scheibcr, At the
Borderland]; Morton Keller, The Varieties of American Legal History: Hurst's History, 6 REVS. AM. lIST.
I (1978) (book review); Earl Finbar Murphy, The Jurisprudence of Legal History: Willard Hurst as a Legal
Historian, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 900 (1964) (book review).
Some leading "Critical Legal Studies" scholars, beginning in the 1970s, argued that the changes
initiated by courts in "instrumentalist" decisions that allegedly transformed the law of torts, property, and
contracts, were consciously designed by judges to redistribute wealth from the agricultural to the
"entrepreneurial" commercial and industrial sectors and as such were part of a pattern of exploitation.
Nonetheless, these scholars did not acknowledge a debt to Hurst. Indeed, they mistakenly lumped him with
"liberal" historians who failed to recognize the redistributive functions of law. This school, however, owed
much to Hurst's identification of the "pragmatic" judicial style (which he also occasionally termed
"instrumental"). Besides, much of Hurst's writing was profoundly critical of the failure of 19th-century
law-and of government more generally-to operate in a rational, accountable, and fair way. See Harry
N. Scheiber, Back to "The Legal Mind"? Doctrinal Analysis and the History of Law, 5 REVS, AM. HIST.
458 (1976) [hereinafter Scheiber, The Legal Mind] (reviewing MORTON J. HoRwriz, TIlE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1790-1860 (1977)) (critiquing one key work in the literature that
misunderstood Hurst yet owed much to his writings); see also Tony Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of
Eminent Domain in Early American Economic Development, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1263 (suggesting that the
distributive effect of the law in the 19th century requires further investigation).
4. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICAN LIFE (1996).
5. Other such pioneering historians include Leonard W. Levy and Richard B. Morris. See LEONARD
W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); RICHARD B. MORRIS,
GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA (1946).
6. The term "police power" is derived from the common law definition of "public police," which
Blackstone described as "the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *162. Justice Story characterized the police power as the instrument for "the promotion
of the peace, health and good order of the society," matters which were among the fundamental duties of
government. [Joseph Story], Natural Law (1832) (originally unpublished manuscript), reprinted in JAMES
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 313, 322 (1971). I think that Professor
Novak exaggerates considerably when he contends that before 1877 American jurists tended to justify the
police power and other elements of state authority mainly on the basis of the common law heritage, while
the post-1877 period was dominated increasingly by liberal constitutionalism and centralization. See
NOVAK, supra note 4, at 188. In Novak's view, "sovereignty" became the keynote of theories relating the
conceptual foundations of the governmental order. See id. ("'Sovereignty' increasingly replaced 'police'
as the key word in regulatory apologetics.").
Chief Justice Taney's formulation of the police power portrayed it as "nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions." License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504, 582 (1847), quoted in Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American
Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217, 221-22 (1984) [hereinafter Scheiber, Public Rights]. My own, more
general reading of the cases from the early Republic, however, is that the arguments based on a theory of
sovereignty and those based on common law notions of common welfare were intimately interrelated. Both
common law theory and the civil law tradition regarded the sovereign (or, for England, the King in
Parliament) as the trustee for the public good. Early American state and federal decisions analyzed in these
terms both the police power and the eminent domain (takings) power. Such cases established not only the
welfare of the community, cast in common law terms, but also the notion of inherent and essential power
flowing from the concept of the state's sovereignty-a notion derived as much from the Continental writers
in civil and natural law as from the British tradition-as a fountainhead of theory. For Continental writers
such as Emmerich de Vattel, who were widely quoted in American legal treatise writings and judicial
decisions, the phrase "attribute of sovereignty" applied to the police power (along with eminent domain
and taxation powers) because the power was "coeval with the State itself" and as much a "natural right"
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Novak analyzes both how American jurists conceptualized the police
power and how implementation patterns signaled the broader public philosophy
concerning the legitimate reach and limitations of government's regulatory
role. Following an extended analysis of the intellectual underpinnings of the
police power in the common law and law of the early Republic, Novak devotes
separate chapters to specific regulatory activities of the states. One chapter, for
example, considers regulations enacted for purposes of public safety, giving
detailed attention to how municipal governments regulated the storage and
handling of gunpowder, an area of law in which the inherited doctrines of
public nuisance were mobilized.' The "superior rights of the public," Novak
finds, were asserted systematically in defense of the public safety: "Property
rights were protected, but relatively, not absolutely."8 Further, in this same
context, Novak considers the response of the law to catastrophic urban fires
such as the disaster New York City suffered in 1835, when the government
relied upon traditional precepts of the law of necessity and demolished
buildings purposefully to create a fire break. Although owners received
compensation, payment was a matter of legislative discretion-and, as
specified by statute, compensation was only for the buildings that were blown
up or torn down, not for their contents. 9 The large doctrinal significance of the
judicial actions was to reiterate the concept that injury to a property owner
might be found to be danmum absque injuria (an injury without remedy).'
0
of the state as any individual rights were "natural"-and thus inalienable. James B. Thayer. The Right of
Eminent Domain, 9 MONTHLY L. REP. (n.s.) 241-42 (1856). quoted ti Harry N Schcibcr. Introduction to
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR TIlE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 3. 8-9 (Charles G
Fenwick trans., Legal Classics Library 1993) (1758); see Scheiber. Public Rights. supra. at 222-24
(discussing the centrally important case of Commonwealth v. Alger. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). in which
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw blended common law public nuisance doctrne. a republican theory of
sovereignty, and implied limitations on the legislature in what soon was recognized as a classic exposition
of police power); see also NOVAK, supra note 4. at 122 (discussing Pennsylvania Chief Justice Gibson's
position on the commonwealth's powers).
Chris Tomlins recently provided a highly original and suggestive analysis of the conceptual ongins
of "police" in the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary era, when the champions of the new Constitution
headed off a potentially powerful republican egalitarianism by successfully contending for the pnmacy of
law over politics. See CHRISTOPHER L. TOsLINS. LAW. LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN TIE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 74-96 (1993). Tomlins's work complements, but in at least one important aspect (with regard
to the question of equality in relation to police) significantly departs from. Novak's interpretation and my
own.
None of the modem analysts, including myself, accepts the view that a prominent student of the
police power, W.G. Hastings, once advanced. Hastings argued that individualistic and property-minded state
and federal judges in the new republic innovated the conceptualization of the police power. which others
saw as having deeper roots in both common and civil law. See W.G. Hastings. The Development of Law
as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the State. 39 PRoC. AM PHIL SOC'Y 359
(1900); see also TOMLINS, supra, at 89 n.101 (arguing that Hastings's attnbution of the concept of the
"police power" to American devotion to limited governance is evidence that the property-minded
"Federalist model" succeeded in dominating even academic thought).
7. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 51-82.
8. Id. at 65.
9. See id. at 71-79.
10. See id. at 72. This same precept was invoked in numerous antebellum cases that found no
compensable losses to property values suffered by private owners damaged by. for example, changes in
road grade. Such proceedings would today be known as inverse condemnation cases, and the outcome
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Here again, Novak draws out the larger meaning for the definition of powers
that the government might exercise when the safety of the public was at stake:
"Houses, goods, occupations, trades, industries, manufactures, sales, exchanges,
land uses, and the like were all subject to regular and harsh public limitations
when the safety of the people was threatened by fire.""
Considering urban market regulations for purposes of assuring sanitary,
quality, and weight standards, Novak notes that, years ago, historians
successfully "exploded the 'myth of laissez-faire' and demonstrated the myriad
ways that law and active state governments furnished the necessary conditions
for early American economic development."' 12 Novak comments, however,
that these earlier studies did not adequately recognize how law and institutions
shaped the market: They tended, he claims, to treat the public- and private-
market sectors as distinct, rather than as interpenetrated by public authority and
especially regulatory power.'3 The author gives the impression that the idea
of an active republican polity, shaping the institutions and profoundly
influencing the dynamics of the private sector, is now to be unveiled as a new
and marvelous discovery. As subsequent sections of this Book Review
indicate, however, no matter how important the content of Professor Novak's
message and how interesting the documentation he offers, this is not an
"alternative story" that ought to come as a startling surprise.
For example, Novak's fourth chapter, titled "Public Ways: The Legal
Construction of Public Space,"' 14 presents the story of "the invention of public
property"' 5 -in the sense that the policing and general regulation of
described would be a rejection of the claim that a "taking" had occurred amounting to eminent domain
action requiring compensation. The line between the police power and the "takings" power, as drawn by
the courts, was precisely the fulcrum on which compensation requirements were decided, and the dannum
absque injuria principle was invoked in that context. Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 418 (1823),
is a classic example in the early American state cases. The court ruled that a house owner had no recourse,
even though the municipal government's regrading of the street exposed his building's foundations and
made it inaccessible from the public way. "Every one who purchases a lot upon the summit or on the
decline of a hill," the court declared, "is presumed to foresee the changes which public necessity or
convenience may require." Id. at 431. It was particularly telling that this case concerned Boston, proclaimed
by the Puritan founder John Winthrop as "a Citty upon a Hill." A MODELL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY (1630),
quoted in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 3 (1958). See generally
NOVAK, supra note 4, at 115-48 (describing the damnum absque injuria principle); Harry N. Scheiber,
Eminent Domain, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 630 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth
Karst eds., 1986) [hereinafter Scheiber, Eminent Domain] (explaining the principle's relationship to eminent
domain); Harry N. Scheiber, State Police Power, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUrION,
supra, at 1744, 1746 [hereinafter Scheiber, State Police Power] (discussing the principle in the context of
the police power).
II. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 81. Fire and similar catastrophes constituted a special circumstance.
evoking the most extreme responses. The remainder of Novak's inquiries deal with circumstances not in
this unique category, and the "regularity" and "harshness" of the public limitations he finds imposed on
private property and on private behavior, economic and social, are of a different order.
12. Id. at 85.
13. See id. The studies Novak has in mind are the "commonwealth" studies that explored the
dimensions of interventionism at the state level. See infra note 177.
14. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 115.
15. Id. at 116.
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highways, other thoroughfares, and public squares, constituted an important
expansion of state governments' regulatory activities and jurisdiction with
ramifications for "the general conduct of economic and social life."' 6 There
is less that is new in this chapter than in the others, both with respect to the
specific cases that are analyzed and with respect to the importance of this
aspect of the law in the antebellum era. Nor can there be any quarrel, I would
imagine, with Novak's reiteration of the contention advanced by others before
him that the jurisprudence of regulatory law for waterways and other public
ways became a fountainhead of public rights doctrines supportive of regulatory
intervention. 17
On the whole, however, Novak offers a great deal of information little
known to students of the period. Sections of Novak's work dealing with the
regulation of disorderly houses,' 8 temperance law,' 9 and several aspects of
public health,20 inevitably use some material from the existing literature. The
author, however, introduces in these sections an important new theme: the
movement of the post-Civil War period toward bureaucratization of control
and, within the federal structure, the movement of governance "upward" from
the local to the state level (and later, after 1877, the further advance of this
movement to policy setting and direction of substantive implementation by the
national government). At the same time, Novak argues, in the liquor
prohibition field and later in other realms of law, "the die of a new
constitutional regime was cast" and "[tihe terms of debate [were] decisively
shifted" because the state courts for the first time were developing a doctrine
of private rights that overrode the classical public rights tradition. -' Here
enters a familiar old friend: Wynehamer v. People,22 in which the New York
Court of Appeals overturned a liquor control law because it violated sacred
rights of property. As Edward Corwin contended some eighty-five years ago
when he made Wynehamer the centerpiece of his argument on the pre-Civil
War origins of substantive due process, this decision (almost unique in
antebellum state jurisprudence) presaged what the courts would expand into a
comprehensive charter for the protection of private rights after the adoption of
16. Id. at 117.
17. See id. at 147. For previous studies advancing this view. see. for example. LEVY. supra note 5.
at 303-21; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF TIlE COMMON LAW 159, 165 (1975). and Harry
N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eninent Domain and Public Purpose in the State Courts. 5 PERSP AM
HIST. 327, 335-55 (1971).
18. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 157-70.
19. See id. at 171-89.
20. See id. at 191-233.
21. Id. at 188.
22. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). cited in NOVAK, supra note 4. at 186. Corwin identified %WInehamer as the
first important antebellum case in which a state court interpreted the "due process" requirment in police
power regulation to encompass substance rather than only procedure See Edward S Cor% in. Due Process
of Law Before the Civil War, in AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL HISTORY 46. 54-55 (Alpheus T Mason &
Gerald Garvey eds., 1964). Corwin also traced the doctnnal lineage of public rights from earlier police
power cases in the eastern and midwestem states. See id. at 46-66.
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 In Novak's framework, the importance of the
New York decision is not merely what it presages but rather what it rejects:
an entire system of law that he portrays as "a local, customary, and
discretionary regime"24-- the law of the well-ordered society in which
regulation had enormous scope and dominance.
Indeed, Novak offers much of value in his intensive examination of several
important aspects of regulation in American governance to 1877. Much of
what Novak represents as his most valuable contribution to an understanding
of basic historical interpretations and cultural aspects of American law,
however, depends on the notion that a distorted view of the past has
prevailed-presumably with scholars as a general matter, and certainly with
respect to the public (which, he says, subscribes to the myth of a golden age
of laissez faire). For example, Novak concludes by summarizing his by now
oft-reiterated view that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the legal order before
1877 was heavily regulatory in character, with no clear separation of "market"
from governmental order, and with a jurisprudential foundation in the common
law rather than in constitutionalism.25 Announcing his intention to write a
successor volume that will deal with the modem (post-1877) liberal-
constitutional state, Novak offers a look ahead by arguing that a paradigm shift
occurred: The old common law tradition, described in this book, "was
discarded, and a new law was invented. 26 Statism and individualism emerged
side by side, both of them energized, paradoxically, by the same new
constitutional jurisprudence.27 The results: "an increasingly centralized,
bureaucratized sovereign state; a sociocultural politics centered around an ever
more thinly defined conception of the self; and a formal and instrumental
approach to law and governance that privileges realistic and radically presentist
formulations of interest and power over idealistic and historical visions of
salus populi."
28
This theme is not new, but Novak's occasionally strong statement of it is
new and extreme. Previous historical writings have recognized very clearly
first, that regulation shaped institutions and constrained private rights in
antebellum America and second, that the legal doctrines that supported such
interventions were developed in a rich matrix of common law, civil law, and
constitutional jurisprudence. Those who are already well aware of this history
in its broad outlines-an audience that will benefit from the way in which
Novak now expands the base of documentation very impressively-will, I
23. See Corwin, supra note 22, at 53-66.
24. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 188. What Corwin avers that Wynehamer rejected was the previously
dominant view that considerations of "due process" were, properly, purely procedural. See Corwin, supra
note 22, at 54-58.
25. See id. at 237.
26. Id. at 247.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 248.
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think, be surprised by the overarching claim Novak advances, namely, that "the
deluge of restrictions on economic life passed by state and local authorities in
this period suggests that 'regulation' might supplant 'the market' as a better
metaphor for the age."29 Whether there was in fact a "deluge," let alone
whether regulation was so obviously the dominant motif of law in that era, will
receive further attention in this Book Review.
Partly because Novak raises this issue, but more importantly because
history-in providing the stuff of the myths by which ideologues and
politicians can cast a mantle of legitimacy over their ideas-matters, we need
to understand correctly how Novak's book fits into the historiography. To
provide that context, therefore, Part I of this Book Review considers the
literature on nineteenth-century law and economic change in America-the
literature upon which Novak builds and to which he adds insightful
perspectives and abundant new data. Part II deals briefly with the narrower
question of how well legal scholars and historians until now have understood
the scope and importance of the specific regulatory legislation and
jurisprudence that form the core subject of Novak's work. Finally, Part III
offers reflections on Novak's larger thesis as to the character of the legal
tradition. I have no quarrel at all with his insistent claim that the historical
record reveals a powerful doctrinal tradition of public rights-a contention I
have advanced over thirty years and that numerous other widely cited
historians have explored. I will argue, however, that there is serious doubt
whether Novak can sustain his sweeping contention that pro-regulatory
doctrines dominated public law and, further, that regulatory principles were the
dominant element in American jurisprudence and working governance from the
Revolutionary era to the 1870s.
The influence of Willard Hurst has been so far-reaching in large part
because of the definitive way in which he demonstrated the extent to which
there was a systematic pragmatic bias in the state court decisions affecting
enterprise. Hurst identified this bias from evidence that courts frequently
preferred the "dynamic" uses of property (that is, active enterprise and
innovation) over legal claims associated with "static" uses, embodied in what
are traditionally known as "vested rights."' 3 By adhering to this pattern of
29. Id. at 84.
30. See JAMES WILLARD HURST. LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN TIlE NINETE&-nI
CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). "Vested rights" are, in the end, the rights that courts will enforce. Use
of the term in constitutional law and legal history generally refers to private nghts in property that are
claimed to have priority over claims of others or, indeed, over claims of government itself-unless a
"taking" is declared under eminent domain procedures, with a requirement of compcrisation. For a bnef
historical survey of the doctrine in American courts, see Harry N. Scheiber. Vested Righis. in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 1962. 1962-64.
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priorities, state courts-and. to no less degree, state constitution writers and
legislatures-advanced what Hurst has called "working" principles expressing
the material values of a society increasingly committed to market capitalism
and the promotion of growth.3 To put it in other terms, Hurst posited that,
during the early phases of nineteenth-century industrialization, 32 "law in
action' 33 reflected the key premise that "it was common sense, and it was
good, to use law to multiply the productive power of the economy."'  In this
respect law was dedicated to what Hurst, in a memorable phrase-whatever its
merits as to precision-termed "the release of energy."35  The phrase
suggested that law was geared in significant ways to support individuals,
groups, communities, and firms in the pursuit of private goals.
36
Hurst's view has been influential, too, for its emphasis on how antebellum
American society relied on the market, particularly on the market's foundations
in private property, for the ordering of its social and economic relationships.
According to Hurst, the prevailing view in law and public policy reflected the
"values of the striving, business-oriented middle class ' '37 and held that there
must be "substantial autonomy for private exercise of will in the market., 38
By emphasizing what easily might be interpreted as the autonomy of the
private realm, and by his attention to aspects of nineteenth-century
jurisprudence that supported and advanced the concepts of economic liberty
and "freedom of contract," Hurst incorporated into his model an important
element of what might be termed the "vested rights" interpretation of
nineteenth-century American law. Ironically, this vested rights model was the
31. See HURST, supra note 30, at 5 (describing "working" principles); HURST, supra note I, at 171-72,
203; see also HURST, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing a "pattern of attitudes and values"); id. at 70
(describing how faith in "our confident working principles" eroded in the face of unforeseen adverse results
of market forces).
32. Hurst deals with the introduction of modem-style bureaucratic regulatory measures and
administration in the last two chapters of Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century
United States. See HURST, supra note 30, at 33-108.
33. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910); see also Roscoe
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REv. 591 (1911), 25
HARV. L. REV. 140, 489 (1911-1912) (discussing law as based on custom and social pressures rather than
on conscious reasoning).
34. HURST, supra note 1, at 172.
35. "The Release of Energy" is the title of the first chapter of Hurst's Law and the Conditions of
Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States. HURST, supra note 30, at 3.
36. Hurst swept into this concept, however, communal or collective values as well as noneconomic
values dear to individuals, and he did not confine "release of energy" to the material side of life. See, e.g.,
HURST, supra note 30, at 27-29 (discussing eminent domain and the police power); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 155-60 (1960) (discussing reasonable uses
of power as the core of the concept of constitutionality and the relation of this concept to state police
power, the commerce power, and authority in fiscal affairs); see also HURST, supra note I, passim
(discussing the early development of public utility law concepts).
37. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (1977). The
dominant forces in politics were not necessarily a true majority, let alone representative of a consensus of
all elements in a diverse population. In 1979, Hurst dealt with his critics on this point in a fascinating
reconsideration of his own work. See James Willard Hurst, Old and New Dimensions ofResearch in United
States Legal History, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1979).
38. HURST, supra note 37, at 228.
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very interpretation that Hurst, in the whole corpus of his work, sought
explicitly to modify and in significant measure to refute. 9
Corwin developed the vested rights model to its fullest form, arguing that
the protection of established property rights against interference by the state
was the basic doctrine of American constitutional law.-' Corwin found
evidence for this interpretation mainly in the post-Civil War federal judiciary's
property-minded doctrines-and especially in the role of the Supreme Court
and many state courts in overturning regulatory and social legislation during
the so-called Lochner4 era. But he also traced its wellsprings to the Marshall
Court's invocation of natural law in its Contract Clause jurisprudence (most
dramatically in the Yazoo Frauds Case4' ) and in a scattering of other pre-
Civil War decisions in which federal and state courts thwarted legislative
tampering with property rights.43 Corwin began to develop his thesis in
articles that appeared as early as 1911, but even today many historians of
antebellum constitutional law emphasize the protective doctrines that the
Marshall Court and other federal courts delineated-with powerful doctrinal
support from James Kent and Joseph Story in their great treatises'-in the
defense of vested rights. 5 In this view of constitutional history, the Taney
Court's decisions-which hedged on the commitment to property rights (most
dramatically in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge4 6) and widened the
range of permissible regulatory action by the states under their police
power-constituted an aberration, definitively corrected when the Court
developed its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in the postwar period and
39. For analysis of the vested fights interpretation, see Schcibcr, At the Borderland. supra note 3:
Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Exproprtation. and Resource Allocation byi Government. /789-19/0, 33
J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973), reprinted in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTT-L'"ON.AL ORDER 132-41
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.. 1978); and Scheiber, supra note 30 Novak provides
a critical summary of the vested fights interpretation. See NOVAK. supra note 4. at 22-23.
40. See Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine ofAmertcan Constitutional Law. 12 MICH L REV
247 (1914).
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). A history of the case and its political background
is provided in C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO (1966).
43. See AMERICAN CONSTITLTIONAL HISTORY: ESSAYS BY EDWARD S. CORWIN (Alpheus T Mason
& Gerald Garvey eds., 1964).
44. See JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LA\'% (Nes' York. 0 Halstead 1827). JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Fred B. Rothman & Co 1991)
(1833).
45. See, e.g., KENT NEWMYER. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH1 STORY STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC (1985); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CU'LTU;RAL CHANGE. 1815-35. at 595-
675 (1988) (Vols. Il-IV of Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court (Paul A Freund
& Stanley N. Katz eds.)); see also George Haskins. Law Versus Politics in rite Eacrlh Years of the Marshall
Court, 130 U. PA. L. REV. I passin (1981) (stating that establishment of the rule of law. and hence
protection of vested property rights, was Marshall's great achievement).
46. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 420 (1837). Stanley Kutler. for one. has placed the history of this case squarely
in a Hurstian framework. See STANLEY 1. KUTLER. PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 102-16 (197 1).
see also CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD. 1836-64. at 71-98 (1974) (Vol V of Ohier Wcndell
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds ))
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the Lochner era.47 In this view, the spirit of America's legal culture in the
early nineteenth century is captured in Justice Story's following assertion in
1829:
[G]overnment can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of
property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body,
without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government
seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property
should be held sacred.48
As a recent study of property rights in American legal history thus
reiterates, "Antebellum legal culture placed a high value on the security of
property. '49 In scores of state court rulings as well as in federal jurisprudence
(including some key cases in which Chief Justice Taney spoke for the Court
in terms much more reminiscent of Marshallian doctrine than of the Charles
River Bridge decision), American jurists "envisioned respect for property rights
as the basis for both ordered liberty and economic development."50 Unlike
Corwin and other orthodox adherents of the vested rights interpretation, Hurst
consistently qualified his portrayal of how the legislatures and courts gave the
market wide play. He likewise qualified his stress upon the significance of
economic liberty as a cherished value. For Hurst, it was important to pay equal
attention to the elements of American law that trenched upon private rights and
modified or rejected private claims in order to advance the concept of the
communal interest and to articulate public values. 5'
Hurst's account of the relationship between the legal system and the
economy systematically emphasized that positive law shaped institutions and
channelled the dynamics of the market. Following Hurst's lead, many
nineteenth-century legal historians have recognized that the doctrines of
contract, property, and tort were multifaceted. They have also recognized that
the police power qualified all three of these doctrinal systems governing
private economic relations.52 Studies that employ this approach hold in firm
and clear focus the ways in which property law doctrines protected and
47. This is the portrayal offered, for example, in the widely used text by ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT 91-120 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994).
48. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., Tiu
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITTrrIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 81 (1992)
(quoting Wilkinson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 657).
49. ELY, supra note 48, at 80.
50. Id. at 80-81; see also Scheiber, supra note 30, passim. For an important analysis of how
republicanism confronted property ights, regulatory claims, and competing theories of constitutionalism,
see R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of
American Jurisprudence, 74 J. AM. HIST. 814 (1987).
51. In particular, see Hurst's treatment of corporation law in JAMES WILLARD HURST, TIlE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970).
52. Cf. HURST, supra note I, passim (developing this view with respect to tax law, labor law, eminent
domain, and the police power).
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nurtured private rights, expressing the values of possessive individualism5
and of freedom of action in market transactions. Such individualistic values
were embedded first, in the precepts of classical contract law (the "freedom of
contract" ideal) prescribing that the will of the parties should be honored; and
second, in the precepts of property law requiring that reasonable use and
expectations, and quiet possession, should be similarly honored!" On the
other hand, however, constitutional and private law judicial decisions regarding
property and business enterprise also embodied a positive doctrine of "public
rights" that expressed community values. As I have written previously, public
rights were much more than a residual leftover after the Contract Clause and
other protections of property were accounted for:"
These doctrines also embody notions of the sovereignty of the state
and its legitimate reach. While governmental power is mobilized and
constrained in our constitutional system, for the protection of private
owners' "dominion" over their property, it is also mobilized in the
name of rights of the public-the notion of salus populi, what we
modems usually term "the public interest." '
The jurists who put in place the foundation stones of vested rights
doctrine relied in part on the language of the Federal Constitution. But they
also invoked the precepts of natural justice and "higher law," and they drew
on the canon of the common law to advocate the fundamental and
inalienable character of private rights. In precisely the same manner,
however, the exponents of public rights found a parallel theory in the
standard treatises of Continental law-by Vattel," Gr o t ius ,S Pufendorf,
9
53. This phrase is adopted from C.B. MACPHERSON. TlHE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM (1962), and is now in wide use.
54. See HURST, supra note 30, at 28-29; HURST. supra note I. at 159-66. 203-04. 343423. HuRST.
supra note 51, passim. Many of the leading aspects of 19th-century contract and property law are
reexamined in essays by Charles McCurdy, Donald Pisani, and others in the forthcoming book. FREEDOsIt
OF CONTRACT AND THE STATE (Harry N. Scheiber ed., forthcoming 1998).
55. See generally Scheiber, Public Rights, supra note 6.
56. Harry N. Scheiber, The Jurisprudence--and Mytholog)-of Eminent Domain in American Legal
History, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENr. CONSTITUTIONAL INrIRPRETATION BEFORE THE NEw
DEAL 217, 221 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds.. 1989) [hereinafter Scheibcr. Jurisprudence-
and Mythology-of Eminent Domain] (quoting Blackstone). Blackstone wrote:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also Harry N. Scheiber. Doctrinal Legacies and
Institutional Innovation: Law and the Economy in American History. 2 LAW. CONTEXT 50. 62-65 (1984)
[hereinafter Scheiber, Doctrinal Legacies].
57. See VATrEL, supra note 6.
58. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (Franci, W. Kelsey ct al. trans..
Clarendon Press 1925) (1646).
59. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET Civis JUxTA LEGEM NATURALEm LIBRI Duo
(F.G. Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682).
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and Bynkershoek-60 -all of which were cited extensively in antebellum state
cases. Their theory posited that the rights of "sovereignty" were inherent and
inalienable powers of the states, serving as the basis for taxation, regulation,
and property takings.6'
Reconciling the ideals of limited government and the rule of law with the
republican theory that the legislature speaks for the people-so that, as Gordon
Wood argues, it becomes questionable "whether the people's personal rights
could meaningfully exist apart from the people's sovereign power"62 -became
"the great dilemma of political leaders in the new republic." 63 It also became
the great dilemma of the republic's jurisprudence, and American lawmakers
did not seek to effect a reconciliation of those competing theories by denying
the prerogatives of the state. Instead, even the most conservative of them
sought a formula that would resolve the tension between individualism and
sovereign power. "Rights of the public" were to be asserted, not without limit,
but within the framework of doctrines such as "public purpose" (a doctrine
formulated by courts to serve as a limitation on taxation or eminent domain)
and the requirement of just compensation for all takings except those
implicating public safety, welfare, or health as measured by standards that
derived from the common law of nuisance or other legitimating canons.64 The
formalization of the police power, worked out in these terms, emerged most
60. See CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LIRBI Duo (Tenney Frank
trans., Clarendon Press 1930) (1737).
61. See LEVY, supra note 5, passim; MORRIS, supra note 5, passim. The Continental jurists were cited
by American judges especially frequently in eminent domain cases. See Scheiber, supra note 17, passimi;
see also NOVAK, supra note 4, at 29-30 (discussing the ramifications of the Continental writers' arguments
on the social nature of human kind). William Stoebuck has used the phrase "inherent power doctrine" to
characterize this strain in Continental jurisprudence. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 559-68 (1972).
62. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 189 (1991).
63. Id.; see also BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938);
Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
64. See generally ELY, supra note 48; ALAN R. JONES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF
THOMAS MCINYTRE COOLEY: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1987); WHITE, supra note 45; Charles
W. McCurdy, Federalism and the Judicial Mind in a Conservative Age: Stephen Field, in POWER DIVIDED:
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 31 (Harry N. Scheiber & Malcolm M. Feeley ds.,
1989) [hereinafter McCurdy, Federalism and the Judicial Mind]; Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and
the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations, 61 J. AmI. HIST. 970 (1975) [hereinafter McCurdy,
Government-Business Relations], reprinted in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra
note 39, at 245; Scott M. Reznick, Empiricism and the Principle of Conditions in the Evolution of the
Police Power: A Model for Definitional Scrutiny, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. I; Scheiber, Public Rights, supra
note 6. The "public purpose" doctrine emerged in the early Republic principally in eminent domain cases;
by the 1850s, however, it was also invoked as a limitation upon the use of taxation. See Harry N. Scheiber,
Public Purpose Doctrine, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 1489. In
his analysis of the colonial era in Massachusetts, offering insight into the doctrinal heritage of public rights
in the 19th-century, William Nelson reviewed the "balancing of private right and public need" in ferry
cases, road construction and maintenance, fire prevention, fish passage on navigable streams, and milldam
construction. NELSON, supra note 17, at 52. He concluded that the statutes "suggest[ed] strongly that private
property served community needs first and individual convenience second." Id. Unlike Professor Novak,
Nelson believes that the collectivist bent of colonial law gave way after the Revolution to a property-
minded and pro-entrepreneurial style. See id. at 144-74.
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dramatically and thoroughly in several cases decided by the Massachusetts
court, particularly in Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's decision in Commonwealth
v. Alger.65 Many scholars during the last four decades have elaborated Alger's
importance, most notably Leonard Levy, in his biography of Shaw,' and
Scott Reznick and I, in articles.67 The literature on these cases and their
doctrinal importance flows directly from the concerns of Hurst and Levy, and
most of the writers who have developed the theme of regulation and its
legitimacy in antebellum American law have done so with a view toward
revising and correcting the vested rights model."5
Hurst's influence, meanwhile, reached out beyond the fields of law and
history proper to persuade economists writing on the history of the U.S.
economy to give serious attention to the impact of legal institutions. Many
such economists proudly designated themselves as "cliometricians" interested
almost exclusively in quantifiable data and, as a matter of methodological
orthodoxy verging on ideology, committed themselves to the idea that
government and the law could be taken as "givens" to be held static in the
background of analysis, as part of that marvelous package of set-asides taken
care of with the strategy of ceteris paribus.69 The historical literature
produced by this school in economic history blocked out law and government,
except as inert "background" or "context."7 When these economists, in the
65. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
66. See LEVY, supra note 5, at 247-54.
67. See Reznick, supra note 64. at 13-19: Schetber. Public Rights. supra note 6. at 221-24
68. Astonishingly enough, however, this entire aspect of Amencan legal histor). in'.oling analyst-,
of the positive state in legal theory and as a reality of the relationship between la, and capitalism. wsas kept
out of view in Morton Horwitz's much-cited study of the "transformation" of American law. see HOR,'.ITt.
supra note 3, whose main thesis is the target of important criticisms in Novak's work See. e g. NOVAK.
supra note 4, at 22-23, 61-62, 274 n.51. Horwitz gave attention to eminent domain lay. but public law,
more generally and its regulatory aspect especially were given almost no play in his book This omission
lent some unwarranted credibility to his main thesis, based on the history of doctrinal innosation in private
law, that the courts adopted an instrumental style to reshape doctnne in the interest of mndusmal
entrepreneurs and the propertied classes uniformly at the expense of the disposscssed and even the agrarian
property owners. See HORwrTz. supra note 3. at 253-54. Early critiques include Charles J McClain. Jr.
Legal Change and Class Interests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwizs The Transformation of American
Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 382 (1980) (book review): and Scheiber. The Legal MAind. supra note 3 Profcs.sor
Horwitz's analysis of contract law, which is central to his thesis. was attacked across a broad etdentary
and interpretive front in an important critical article by A.W.B Simpson. See A.' B Simpson. The HorhtZ
Thesis and the History of Contracts. 46 U. Ctmt. L. REv. 533 (1979).
69. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, GRO\WTrH AND WELFARE IN Tit AMIERICA% PAST (2d ed 1974)
(exemplifying this view). Professor North. co-winner with Robert William Fogel of the Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economics, subsequently assumed a very different posture and devoted himself to intensi.,e
analysis of institutions and their impact. For an insightful recollection and anal>,sis of North's and Fogel's
contributions to the "New Economic History," see ROGER L. RANSOM1 Er AL. ExPLORATIONS IN T'IE NE,\.
EcONOMIc HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DOUGLASS C. NORTi (1982). See also Lance E_ Davis. It's
a Long, Long Road to Tipperary or Reflections on Organtzed Violence. Protection Rates, and Related
Topics: The New Political History, 40 J. ECON. HIST. I (1980) (discussing institutional analysis in relation
to quantification).
70. This methodology drew strenuous objections from historians and some legal scholars See e g.
TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: TH.E FEDERAL COt RTS A"D BLSIESS l"% ARICA% HISTORY
(1979); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAM,. 1973): Charles W McCurdy. Stephen
J. Field and Public Land Law Development in California. 1850-1866 A Case Studs of Judicial Resourte
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late 1970s, finally began to recognize the importance of institutions generally
and property rights in particular, the shift came about in part because of Hurst
and other legal historians. They had demonstrated that "the market" was itself
an institution whose structure and distribution of advantages were defined in
large part by conscious political decisionmaking, by the investment of public
funds in the provision of infrastructure, and by the shifting, purposive
allocation of property rights and privileges.7' Also recaptured in mainstream
scholarship on economic history (which has shifted since the 1950s from the
discipline of history largely to the segment of the field dominated by
economists) was recognition of the importance of conscious planning in public
economic policy, especially in transportation policy. The economists also began
to take serious account of the roles of publicly owned, financed, and operated
enterprises in the transport and banking sectors. A long-established line of
historical studies, dating from the 1930s and continuing to the present, has
dealt with this aspect of public sector involvement in the dynamics of
economic change. 2
Regulatory law before 1877, however, generally received little attention in
historical writings by economists. 73 When economists gave law systematic
consideration, they focused most often on property rights; regulation entered
the analysis, in nearly all instances, only with respect to federal administrative
law late in the century.74 Even in studies by Robert Heilbroner, an economist
Allocation in Nineteenth-Century America, 10 L. & Soc'Y REV. 235 (1975-1976); Harry N. Scheibcr,
Federalism and the American Economic Order 1789-1910, 10 L. & SOC'Y REV. 57 (1975-1976)
[hereinafter Scheiber, Federalism]; Harry N. Scheiber, Law and Political Institutions, in 2 ENCYCLOP13DIA
OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 487 (Glenn Porter ed., 1980) [hereinafter Scheiber, Law and Political
Institutions]; Harry N. Scheiber, Regulation, Property Rights, and Definition of "The Market": Law and
the American Economy, 41 J. ECON. HIST. 103 (1981) [hereinafter Scheiber. Regulation]; Harold D.
Woodman, Post-Civil War Southern Agriculture and the Law, 53 AGRIC. HIST. 319 (1979). Major
contributions to the dialogue on this issue were made in a symposium organized in honor of Hurst by
Professor Robert W. Gordon. See Symposium, Law and Society in American History: Essays in Honor of
J. Willard Hurst, 10 L. & Soc'y REV. 9 (1975-1976). Professor Morton Keller, of the Brandeis University
Department of History, and Albro Martin, then of the Harvard Business School, pursued the dialogue
further by organizing another symposium. See Symposium, Legal and Business History, 53 BUS. HIST. REV.
295 (1979); see also James Soltow, American Institutional Studies: Present Knowledge and Past Trends,
21 J. ECON. HIST. 87 (1971) (discussing the importance of institutions, including government, in economic
history).
71. See Scheiber, Regulation, supra note 70, passim.
72. See Robert A. Lively, The American System: A Review Article, 29 Bus. HIsT. REV. 81 (1955);
Donald J. Pisani, Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American Economy, 75 J. AM. HIST.
740 (1987); Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the "Commonwealth" Policy in
Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (1972); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Economic Policy
and the American Legal System: Historical Perspectives, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1159 [hereinafter Scheiber,
Public Economic Policy].
73. A very important exception was the research of Jonathan Hughes, who did not do much original
work in primary sources on the subject but nevertheless gave regulation serious attention. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN R.T. HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENTAL HABIT: ECONOMIC CONTROLS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
THE PRESENT (1977) (detailing the continuity of the common law heritage from England and colonial
America to the modem day).
74. See, e.g., LANCE DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971); NORTH, supra note 69. Similarly, the role of state government in American
history, especially before 1950, is largely ignored by scholars in political science who offer grand
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sympathetic to the objectives of modern welfare and regulatory measures who
stands opposite free-market enthusiasists on the ideological spectrum, one finds
virtually no awareness that a regulatory tradition existed in the nineteenth
century at all.
75
An equally extreme neglect of the regulatory tradition in governance, and
of the public rights tradition in American jurisprudence, occurs in the writings
of some "free market" adherents in the field of legal scholarship. The most
notable is Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago Law School,
whose attacks on the jurisprudential heritage of the New Deal period are often
cast in historical terms and who typically cites the "original understanding" of
constitutional imperatives to discredit modem constitutional norms that have
legitimated interventionist policies.76 Scholars who follow this line are
unwilling to admit that government interventions have made any positive
contributions to economic growth and development, let alone to the well-being
of the citizenry or the advancement of individual aspirations. They also carry
the vested rights view so far as to deny the legitimacy not only of the modern
era's New Deal constitutional legacy, but also of historical scholarship like
Hurst's that has shown how intervention represents a core element of the
inherited American legal tradition. In fact, Epstein contends that virtually all
governmental interventions that produce costs to private property owners are
"takings" and hence must be compensated. 77 Further, Epstein believes that
this notion is consistent with Blackstone's version of common law in the
1780s, which he claims was incorporated wholesale (frozen and immobile, like
a mammoth fixed in the ice of a tundra) into American constitutional law at
the nation's founding. 7' The persistence of this kind of approach gives some
force to Professor Novak's insistent assertions that modem free market,
antiregulatory, anti-welfare-state politicians and their scholarly allies have
successfully promoted a myth depicting a golden age of laissez faire in the
interpretations of government and the economy. See. e.g.. Chalmers Johnson. The Idea of Industrial Polic.
Introduction to THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATE 3 (Chalmers Johnson ed.. 1984); Aaron Wildavsky.
Squaring the Political Circle: Industrial Policies and the American Dream. tin TIlE INDLSTRIAL POLICY
DEBATE, supra, at 27. An exception is Frank J. Mauro. State and Local Promotion of Innovation. in LEGAL
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 321 (Richard A. Givens ed.. 1982).
75. See. e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER. TIlE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMAT10. OF
AMERICA (1977).
76. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985). This is not the occasion for developing the details of the views of free market ideological advocates
such as Richard Epstein or, for example, Bernard Siegan. another writer whose allegedly historical studies
are largely oblivious to a vast body of evidence and scholarly writing that refutes his main ("ibertarian-)
thesis. See. e.g., BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrTL'noN (1980); cf ELLEN
FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987) (accepting a broad scope for the poltce
power but also seeking a middle ground on the question of the eminent domain posver by starlting from a
position sympathetic to the neo-libertarian view).
77. See EPSTEIN, supra note 76. passim.
78. See, e.g., id. at 22-23 (arguing that Blackstone's account of private property best explains what
the term means in the Takings Clause).
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American past. 79
In fact, I would contend that, except for the small segment of the scholarly
community that Epstein and like-minded colleagues represent, there has been
a growing appreciation-common to law, history, and economics-of the
significant impact of public sector investment and "public rights"
jurisprudential doctrines (among others) on the nineteenth-century American
economy. Indeed, a lively and continuing scholarly interest persists in the
approach that Hurst exemplified, an approach that embraces the tension
between sovereignty, public rights, private claims, and other constitutional
doctrines (such as states' rights and national supremacy) during the nineteenth
century. ° Carol Rose's work on community rights, "sociability," and the
question of the commons in relation to localism and republicanism, for
instance, has extended the Hurstian framework in a highly original way.81
Hurst's framework has also provided context for new monographic studies that
have explored the ways in which traditional communities and "precommercial"
interests sought to mobilize egalitarian values and claims of natural rights in
a valiant resistance to the incursions of the market economy.82 Lawrence
Friedman's now-classic work on the history of contract law in Wisconsin, for
example, indicated how a great variety of important governmental functions
during the nineteenth century were performed through private law doctrines as
79. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 6-8, 247-48. As I indicate, however, I think that Novak exaggerates
the extent to which this ideological and ahistorical approach to legal and jurisprudential tradition is taken
at face value in the scholarly world. See infra Part Ill.
80. A full and incisive critical survey of the literature, still quite current though written nearly ten
years ago, appears in Pisani, supra note 72. Also of interest with respect to property rights and regulation,
and the implications for republicanism, are JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990); and WOOD,
supra note 62. Community (or collective) values and private rights are a major theme in the interesting
essays in TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION (Herman Belz
et al. eds., 1992). The relationship of economic individualism to republicanism-a relationship with broad
implications for how we ought to interpret and implement "public rights" claims in jurisprudence and
law-was a subject created by Joyce Appleby, whose influential writings are taken up in several essays in
TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION, stupra; see especially, however, the critiques in Kenneth Karst,
Liberalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 311 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Supp. I 1992);
and Donald Winch, Economic Liberalism as Ideology: The Appleby Vision, 38 ECON. HIST. REV. 287
(1985).
81. See CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, in PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP
105, 145-50 (1994). Sociability is also explored sensitively in relation to the jurisprudence of the early
Republic in a remarkable article by David Thomas Konig. See David Thomas Konig, Jurisprudence and
Social Policy in the New Republic, in DEVISING LIBERTY: PRESERVING AND CREATING FREEDOM IN THE
NEW AMERICAN REPUBLIC 178, 184-88 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1995).
82. An exceptionally vivid example of such a confrontation is given in a study of how the traditional
fishing rights on Carolina rivers and streams were threatened and then defended in a losing battle by those
who fought in the name of traditional communal rights. See Harry L. Watson, "The Common Rights of
Mankind?": Subsistence, Shad, and Commerce in the Early Republican South, 83 J. AM. HIST. 1 (1996);
infra notes 176-181 and accompanying text; see also Steven Hahn, The Yeomanry of the Nonplantation
South: Upper Piedmont Georgia, 1850-1860, in CLASS, CONFLICT, AND CONSENSUS: ANTEBELLUM
SOUTHERN COMMUNITY STUDIES 29 (Orville Vernon Burton & Robert C. McMath, Jr., eds., 1982)
(discussing yeomans' claims to grazing rights in the back country and other traditional and egalitarian
claims).
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well as through public law innovations at a time when fiscal restraints, lack of
political will to support bureaucratized government, and reliance upon self-
enforcing legal instrumentalities limited the public sector's administrative
capacity.83 Hendrik Hartog provided important insights into how the public
sector developed an independent administrative competence at the municipal
level in the early years of the Republic.8 Tony Freyer's studies of company
law, federal and state commercial law, and state police and eminent domain
powers have enriched further our understanding of how public rights doctrines
related to the values of localism and republicanism."5 In a searching
reappraisal of nineteenth-century labor relations and the law, Christopher
Tomlins too has demonstrated that American jurists were forced to confront
robust public rights and communal rights doctrines, even at the height of the
movement that carried American law into a highly individualistic mode in the
employment relationship and industrial accident areas."
Morton Keller's magisterial study of American governmental institutions
and their operations during the postbellum period exemplifies the extent to
which historical overviews and syntheses have incorporated issues of law and
the economy.87 Keller explores a broad range of questions that Hurst has
made central to the literature on the relation between law and economic
change. Consider also that in Charles Grier Sellers's 1991 study of Jacksonian
America, the author pursues similar themes against the background premise
that "lawyers were the shock troops of capitalism. " Similarly, Howard
Gillman's splendid book on Lochner-like doctrine in the long-term
development of nineteenth-century regulatory law brilliantly manifests a
continuing quest to understand the full dimensions of the origins, continuities,
and adaptations of regulatory norms and constitutional doctrine."
As the foregoing survey has, I hope, made clear, some deep cleavages
persist between those who see the historic tradition of American law in relation
to economy and society as benign and those who instead regard that tradition
as insidious (either because the deployment of law systematically abetted
exploitation of the dispossessed or, alternatively, because law increasingly
permitted government to become excessively interventionist and hostile to
83. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA A SOCIAL 'ND ECONOmIC CASE
STUDY (1965).
84. See HENDRIK HARTOG. PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE PO\% ER TIlE CORPORATION OF THF CrrY
OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983).
85. See FREYER, supra note 70; TONY A. FREYER. PRODUCERS VERSUS CAPITALISM CONsTriuONAL
CONFLICT IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (1994).
86. See TOMLINS, supra note 6, at 129-79.
87. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBUC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTL R) AMERICA
(1977).
88. CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION JACKSONIAN AMERICA IS 15-1 8.6, at 47 11991)
89. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOcI',ER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); see also JONES. supra note 64. McCurdy. Goerrninent.Business
Relations, supra note 64.
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individualism). The literature exhibits three distinctive approaches. First is the
vested rights model, which regards the protection of property rights as the
dominant tradition and portrays regulation as a late development (be it salutary
or deplorable) in the historical picture. Second is the view that a highly
pragmatic, or instrumental, judicial style prevailed in a legal culture that gave
primacy to material growth. Some scholars link this view to the notion of an
exploitative legal system, working against the interests of those who were
economically dispossessed; others have credited Hurst's belief that "release of
energy" had many dimensions. Third is the model with which I have sought
to explain the overall record, a model portraying tension among competing
concepts of public rights and private claims rather than depicting law's
influence on society as monolithic at any moment in time or linear with respect
to how it changed over time. Whichever interpretation survives further scrutiny
by students of the legal tradition, at least today we can say with confidence
that the complexities of the institutional and doctrinal history are no longer
generally lost from sight in a framework of vested rights theory or, even
worse, lost from sight altogether in historical analysis.
With respect to Professor Novak's book in particular, it is misleading to
insist, as he does, that an appreciation of government's positive role and of
public rights doctrine is absent from our scholarship, let alone that it has
suffered "terminal neglect" 9 or been "erased from American history."9' The
importance of Novak's own scholarship on the history of law and society
speaks for itself and does not require such hyperbole to gain the attention it
deserves.
II
Anyone interested in nineteenth-century American law and governance
who has been paying attention to the literature on this subject at any time in
the last thirty years could hardly be unaware of the kind of regulation that
concerns Professor Novak in this new book. This is not to say that his
explorations are redundant or that they lack originality; on the contrary, they
have a depth and interest that make his study unique. Nonetheless, precisely
because history (and concomitant mythmaking) matters so much to our
understanding of the American legal tradition, it is important to know how
historians until now have regarded the traditions of intervention and regulation,
as well as how they have understood the jurisprudence that gave regulation its
constitutional and legal sanction.
Consider what the article on regulation in the standard modern
encyclopedia of American constitutional law and history, published in 1986,
90. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 7.
91. Id. at 9.
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had to say of regulations in the antebellum period: "Long and widespread
practice throughout the country," William Letwin wrote, "confirmed that state
legislatures can indeed regulate the terms and conditions not only of trade but
also of production, as well as entry into various occupations-though courts
repeatedly insisted that the states' police powers, broad though they were, must
be limited by profound constitutional antipathy to arbitrary action."'
Even the Lochner era, Letwin asserted, should be seen as "a relatively
short interval" during which the federal judiciary invalidated "a few particular
forms of economic regulation," but did so without placing in doubt the
constitutionality of the state legislatures' regulatory powers across a broad
range of social and economic matters. 93 Regulatory intervention under state
law, of course, including municipal government regulations, was a "historically
continuous practice" in American governance.9' "Seldom questioned" in the
antebellum era, as Letwin reminded us,
[was] the constitutional authority of the states to carry on any and
every form of economic regulation .... [S]tate and local
governments set the prices to be charged by wagoners, wood sawyers,
chimneysweeps, pawnbrokers, hackney carriages, ferries, wharfs,
bridges, and bakers; required licensing of auctioneers, retailers,
restaurants, taverns, vendors of lottery tickets, and slaughterhouses;
and inspected the quality of timber, shingles, onions, butter, nails,
tobacco, salted meat and fish, and bread. This very incomplete list
attests to an intention to exercise detailed control over the operation
of markets, especially (though not only) those that have since been
92. William Letwin, Economic Regulation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTIrrlmON. supra
note 10, at 602, 603.
93. Id. The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution also published an article by Bernard Sicgan
reiterating the litany of Supreme Court decisions and dicta that spoke of the sanctity of property rights but
ignoring completely all well-known Supreme Court jurisprudence supporting state police powers validating
the tradition of public rights. See Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrTON. supra note 10. at 600. 600-02. It became common in
the Reagan-Bush era for neoconservatives to cite this revival of a long-discredited laissez faire version of
American law and constitutional history in order to give historic legitimacy to their legislative proposals.
See Hugh Heclo, Reaganism and the Search for a Public Philosophy, in PERSPEcriVES O. TriE REAGAN
YEARS 31, 31-63 (John L. Palmer ed., 1986). See generally THE NEV DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985). This movement was expressed most recently in the efforts
of conservative Republicans to justify the crippling of environmental and other regulatory legislation's
effectiveness through so-called "property rights" bills that would require compensation for diminution of
property values attributable to regulation. Initiatives and referenda in several states (including Washington
and Arizona) were introduced in the 1996 elections to impose compensation requirements on regulatory
law at the state level; they failed to pass. See Edmund L. Andrews. Outlook '96: The Economy Giving
Business a Chance To Test the Wings of Deregulation. N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 2. 1996. at CI (providing a
summary of the issues expressed in the "property rights bill" and its place in the Republican agenda for
the 1996 elections); Arizona Voters Defeat a Property Initiative. N.Y. TiMES. Nov. 14. 1994. at B8
(discussing Arizona's defeat of a similar bill); John H. Cushman. Jr.. House Clears More Limits on
Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3. 1995. at A19 (discussing a House bill that would preclude
prevention of development on ecological grounds unless the landowner is compensated for any decrease
in property value); Bill Slocum, Property Rights vs. Ecological Concern. N.Y. TIMES. June 16. 1996. § 13
(Connecticut Weekly), at I (discussing a legislative fight in Connecticut).
94. Letwin, supra note 92, at 603.
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
characterized as providing "public services" and those thought to be
morally dubious because of association with usury, betting,
intoxication, or excessive jubilation.95
As Letwin concludes, "American governments were never dogmatically
addicted to laissez-faire, notwithstanding a broad though sometimes faltering
preference for private enterprise, and the Constitution, as intended, written, and
interpreted, is not a manifesto in favor of laissez-faire.96
In his pathbreaking A History of American Law, 97 published a decade and
a half earlier, Lawrence Friedman likewise recognized the importance of
regulation during the period 1776 to 1847. There is no ideological boundary-
drawing in the record, Friedman wrote, and on the whole, "Economic law was
practical and promotional. ' g Yet regulations of all kinds, he showed, were
also manifest in state statutes and municipal ordinances: Legislation in
Georgia, Connecticut, and New York imposed quality controls and inspection,
specified marketing standards, and regulated auctioneers and itinerant
peddlers.99 In Massachusetts, meanwhile, laws regulated fish farming, bird
hunting, cranberry picking, and the like.1t ° Drawing upon standard
monographs on Massachusetts policy'0 ' and on the history of medical
licensing, 102 Professor Friedman's account demonstrated how quarantine
regulations and nuisance laws trenched on property rights, and how consumer-
oriented regulations posed at least a doctrinal challenge to the notion of caveat
emptor in the common law of contract.
13
95. Id.
96. Id. I do not pursue in this Book Review the question of whether the Constitution should be
interpreted as having intended to impose a laissez faire regime on either federal law or, by extension, state
law. The early history of constitutional adjudication, even during the height of Marshall Court influence,
shows little evidence of any such intention or interpretation. See Scheiber, State Police Power, supra note
10, at 1744-51. Moreover, scholarship on the Constitutional Convention and the founding era has firmly
established that the leaders who gathered at Philadelphia in 1787 to write a new charter, and certainly the
politicians on both sides of the Federalist-Antifederalist divide who comprised the first Congress,
consciously laid the foundations for a neomereantilist regime and were in no way committed to laissez faire
as the controlling principle of regulatory law. See JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF INDEPENDENCE:
NEOMERCANTILISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1993); E.A.J. JOHNSON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC FREEDOM: GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE IN THE AGE OF WASHINGTON (1973).
97. FRIEDMAN, supra note 70.
98. Id. at 161.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 161-62.
101. See OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1744-1861 (rev. ed. 1969).
102. See RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650-1965 (1967). John
Duffy and Charles Rosenberg have conducted especially important research on the history of police power
interventions for protection of public health, research which forms essential background to Novak's
discussion, see NOVAK, supra note 4, at 149-89, of legal and institutional responses to the cholera
epidemics and other public health problems. See JOHN DUFFY, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1866-1966 (1974); JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
HEALTH (1990); CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 1832, 1849, AND
1866 (1962).
103. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 161-63.
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Scholars have done more than identify a strong regulatory strain in the
history of American law and its relation to the economy; they have also
recognized that interventions by state governments represent a continuation of
a long tradition dating to the colonial period, a tradition reflecting the
foundation of America's economic and social legislation in English common
law. A case in point is the history of American labor law. Richard Morris's
book, which was long the leading work on the subject, traced themes such as
types and degrees of servitude, the status of apprentices, and wage and craft
regulations, from the colonial era well into the nineteenth century."° Chris
Tomlins's more recent scholarship on the same subject also gives abundant
attention to the inheritance of common law that sought to prevent market
models and the legal fiction of equality of bargaining from prevailing.0"
These doctrines were advocated by counsel in key labor cases in the 1840s,
and though they did not win out at the time, they were indicative, at minimum,
of the duality (or multiplicity) of doctrinal tradition.'06
Three other examples will illustrate the point. First, economic historian
Jonathan Hughes has posited that in colonial America "virtually every aspect
of economic life was subject to nonmarket controls."'" According to
Hughes, the body of statutory law and judicial precedent established over
nearly two centuries of colonial development "was like an institutional gene
pool."' 8 He noted, "Most of the colonial institutions and practices live on
today in some form, and there is very little in the way of nonmarket control
of the economy that does not have a colonial or English forerunner."""'
Throughout American history, governmental policies at all levels in the federal
system have included a powerful component of regulatory law "because. put
bluntly, Americans distrust capitalism in its pure form.""" Hughes faulted
state intervention for being too fragmented, too driven by ad hoc responses to
crises, and too often captured by special interests."' In this respect, his view
echoed the powerful critique Willard Hurst long levied against the failures of
American law. Historically, especially prior to the Progressive era, Hurst
argued, American governance failed to define and pursue the public interest
effectively. f"2 The result was "drift and default," incoherence of policy,
responsiveness without responsibility, and a lack of the administrative
104. MORRIS, supra note 5.
105. See TOMLINS, supra note 6.
106. See id. at 333-63.
107. HUGHES, supra note 73. at 49. Hughes. as has been noted. is the exception among ccononust.
who have written on the nineteenth-century economy' He has been ssell-informed on mnter,entioni-sm and
given it an important place in his analyses of institutional change and ihe dNnamics of gro\%th See supra
note 73.
108. HUGHES, supra note 73, at 49.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 238.
111. See id. at 238-41.
112. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 30. at 53
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competence needed to keep the public sector's power on par with a fast-
developing corporate sector. 13 It is an interesting question whether this
failure to fulfill the ideals of public rights (a failure posited by both Hurst and
Hughes) itself constitutes an important element of continuity in American
law." 4 In any event, there has been no absence in the literature-whatever
the failures of some commentators to take account of that literature " 5-of
studies affirming the salience and continuity of regulatory themes in law and
governance.
Second, the scholarship of the last three decades has established that
several doctrinal areas of nineteenth-century law were anchored in a public
rights tradition and a theory of sovereignty that themselves originated at least
three centuries earlier. One such area is a doctrine that Lord Matthew Hale
first systematized in his treatise De Portibus Maris, published circa 1670.'6
Hale provided a carefully formulated distinction between public waters under
control of the sovereign (publicijuris), for the use of the public; purely private
waters (juris privati), from which the public might be excluded by private
owners; and waters that were under private ownership yet affected with a
public interest and hence subject to public regulation." 7 In 1971, I showed
that Hale's tripartite formulation of property rights in waters was a doctrinal
staple in the antebellum state courts and of key importance to the process
through which American judges fashioned a doctrine of public rights, first in
the eminent domain area and later in the realms of the police power, public
trust, and tax law."8 Professor Carol Rose has advanced that analysis
considerably in developing her argument that communal and localistic claims
113. Id. There are some areas of the historical record in which various critiques on this line might be
extended effectively to take account of the ways in which direct ballot democracy (e.g., the successful
campaign to incorporate racist provisions into the 1879 California state constitution, see generally Harry
N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 1879 California Constitution,
17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 35 (1989)) should be incorporated into the body of evidence supporting Hurst's
view that "[I]aw did foster a good deal of injustice." HURST, supra note 37, at 223. Hurst argued that such
injustice did not occur exclusively or even largely because of class-oriented judicial decisions in the pattern
that Horwitz, for one, sought to argue was the prevailing norm. See Scheiber, Public Economic Policy,
supra note 72, at 1166-71, 1183-84. See generally DAVID ALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST:
CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND NEVADA, 1840-1890 (1992).
114. See Scheiber, Doctrinal Legacies, supra note 56, at 66.
115. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 76; SIEGAN, supra note 76.
116. LORD MATrHEW HALE, DE PORTIBUS MARtS, in COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW
OF ENGLAND 72, 72-83 (Francis Hargrave ed., London, T. Wright 1787) (c. 1670).
117. See id. These concepts were incorporated into American law in the Granger Cases and were long
believed (based on Fairman's contentions) to have been introduced as a result of a chance discovery of
Hale's treatise because of a reprinting. See Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877); Winona & St. P.R.R.
v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877); Chicago, M., & St. P.R.R. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Peik v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago, B., & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1877); Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5
STAN. L. REV. 587, 587-91 (1953). 1 have previously demonstrated that in fact the Justices in 1876-1877
must have been entirely familiar with Lord Hale's theory, and that the concept of waters "private in
ownership but affected with a public interest" had been deployed on manifold occasions for six decades
in the state courts. See generally Scheiber, supra note 17.
118. See Scheiber, supra note 17, at 335-55.
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had a much larger place in antebellum constitutional adjudication than scholars
have previously recognized."t 9
Professor Novak has incorporated into his book the foregoing view of
Hale's heritage in American state law and the ways in which it helped build
the doctrinal foundations of a regulatory tradition, and the issue need not
detain us further here. There is a linkage, however, between this element in the
common law tradition-which became fused with American constitutionalism
in decisions such as Commonwealth v. Alger- 1-and a different common
law doctrine whose foundations in the ancient common law and adaptation by
American courts also form an important part of what we have learned in recent
years about the history of public rights. This latter is the doctrine of "duty to
serve," which Charles Haar and Daniel Fessler traced back to the fifteenth
century (if not earlier). 12' The doctrine originated when a monopoly power
conferred to English mills, ferries, and markets-types of activity "affected
with a public interest"-was conditioned implicitly on fulfillment of duties to
the public.' 2 Haar and Fessler suggested that the subsequent history of this
doctrine supports two aspects of American legal development worthy of our
attention. They contended that the decisions of American judges on implicit
and explicit obligations to the public of enterprises deemed to be affected with
a public interest bespoke an "underlying belief that ... the common law was
up to the task of founding public policy.' 2 3 In addition, they linked this
critical dimension of public rights doctrine to the question of equality of rights.
Elaborating on the publici juris doctrine, they argued that when enterprises
were deemed subject to regulation under that classification, courts required
such enterprises to grant equality of access to members of the community
seeking to use them.2 4 Haar and Fessler's persuasiveness on this point
indicates, I believe, that Novak's analysis would have been stronger had it
taken adequate account not only of this discrete issue but also of the larger
nexus between public interest concepts and egalitarian ideals in the formation
of public rights law.'25
My third example is Howard Gillman's recent research which has further
reinforced the concern (so central in the literature on legal-economic history)
119. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution Versus the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from
the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism. 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74 (1989).
120. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). Other cases advanced the definition of the police power and
likewise promoted this fusion. See Scheiber State Police Power. supra note 10. at 1746 (discussing
landmark cases on this subject); see also NOVAK. supra note 4. at 106-11 (same).
121. See CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FEssLER. THE WRONG SIDE OF TIlE TRACKS: A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST INEQUALITY (1986).
122. See id. at 15.
123. Id. at 111.
124. See id. at 191-92; see also id. at 147 (using the argument on Hale in Scheiber. supra note 17).
Elsewhere, Haar and Fessler draw upon Leonard Levy's study of the Shaw Court and ,is accomplishment
in defining basic elements of a public rights doctrine. See id. at 123.
125. I return to the subject of equality later in this Book Review. See infra Pan III
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with continuities in the doctrines bearing on economic institutions and legal
relationships and on the evolution of the police power in particular.1
26
Arguing against both the vested rights model and the exploitation thesis that
portrays American jurists as engaged in an orchestrated effort to exploit the
dispossessed in order to promote industrial capitalism, Gillman reexamined the
evidence with a view toward understanding judicial motivations. He sought
to encourage a renewed appreciation of the extent to which judicial
behavior ... may be motivated by a set of interests and concerns that
are relatively distinct from the preferences of particular social groups,
the policies prescribed by particular economic theories, or the personal
social and political loyalties and sympathies of individual
judges.'27
Gillman's analysis of substantive change in judicial interpretation of police
power is important for his identification of the Jacksonian period as a
watershed of major innovation, when courts began "to emphasize the
illegitimacy of so-called unequal, partial, class, or special legislation; that is,
legislation which advanced the interests of only a part of the community.'
2
In Gillman's analysis, as in Haar and Fessler's on the doctrine of duty to
serve, considerations of equality surfaced as criteria for establishing
constitutionality. For example, Gillman quoted an 1815 Massachusetts decision
that, while upholding a special tax on the original stock of incorporated banks,
ruled that the legislature could levy such burdens only in a way that conformed
with a standard of equality: "'Taxes of this sort must undoubtedly be equal;
that is, they must operate upon all persons who exercise the employment which
is so taxed."",129 This type of egalitarian jurisprudential standard was reshaped
in the late nineteenth century-and indeed by the Court in Lochner v. New
York 30 in 1905-as a means to guard against the evil effects of "class
legislation." That process, Gillman contended, revealed the abiding strength of
continuities in legal and political culture. Their incorporation into the
conservative jurisprudence of the Lochner era, he argued, indicates how jurists
confronting class conflict and major social dislocations in the era of high
industrialization could remain constant in seeing the problems of their day
"through an ideological prism developed by another group of social elites in
response to the social turmoil of the 1780s," the founding period of the
Republic. 
131
126. See GILLMAN, supra note 89.
127. Id. at II.
128. Id. at 49.
129. Id. at 50 (quoting Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. (12 Tyng) 252, 257 (1815)).
130. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
131. GILLMAN, supra note 89, at 199. Several of the state constitutions of the Revolutionary period
and the early 19th century specifically referred to the imperative of equality of treatment in legislation. For
example, the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 stated that government is not instituted "for the particular
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One need not accept every particular aspect of Gillman's historical
arguments to credit him for wrestling with issues of doctrinal continuity in law
and their relationship to social and political ideological continuities. We should
also credit him for building on the earlier work of Alan Jones on Justice
Thomas Cooley, 32 of Charles McCurdy on Justice Stephen Field,'" and
of Willard Hurst on the history of corporation law' to advance our
understanding of vital functional connections between the successful
jurisprudential response to monopoly and the problem of inequality in the
Federalist, Jacksonian, and post-Civil War eras. Here again, the nexus between
equality and the police power surfaces as a problem that deserved further
exploration in Novak's book. Gillman demonstrated how the abhorrence of
anything that appeared to be "class legislation"-involving the dispensation of
government's largess or the imposition of regulatory sanctions in a
discriminatory manner-triggered concerns about equality of treatment and due
process. That demands for judicial estoppel of "class legislation" came from
groups that often were themselves privileged in other ways, and that the
society sustained race and sex discrimination throughout the period of such
debates, may be dismaying. It is no more so, however, than the fact that all of
the nineteenth-century American rhetoric about "community," public values,
and collective rights that Novak and others (including myself) have viewed
with such admiration was also articulated in that identical context-indeed, in
a society that protected African-American slavery in addition to accepting
systematic racial and gender discrimination.
III
In light of the broad recognition accorded the history of regulation in
previous studies, why must it still be said that Novak's new exploration of the
police power and its history is a work that makes a unique and no doubt
enduringly important contribution to our understanding of the development of
public rights doctrine? How does it cast significant new light on nineteenth-
century "governance" generally (i.e., on the character and operation of
American legal and governmental institutions)?1
35
emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men" but rather is "instituted for the common
benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community." PA. CONST. of 1776. an. V. see also
L. RoY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOP.ME.%T
IN NEW YORK, 1800-1860, at 183-89 (1988). See generally Robert F Williams. Equaln Guarantees in
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1195 (1985).
132. See JONES, supra note 64.
133. See McCurdy, Government-Business Relations, supra note 64
134. See HURST, supra note 51.
135. Novak has offered a formal definition of "governance" that some might find rather obscure. if
not outright baffling. He defines governance as "a constitutive public practice-a technology of public
action with its own history, structures, and rationalities that produce as much as they arce produced by
economics, ideology, and culture." NOVAK, supra note 4, at 8, He goes on to speak of "governance as
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The book is of exceptional interest, first of all, because of the sheer
volume of cases in the appellate courts that Novak has read and offered in
support of his views. With respect to the general jurisprudence of public rights,
Novak builds upon interpretive concepts that a variety of previous scholars
have elucidated. Even in this regard, however, he undertakes a very full and
hence particularly useful integration of themes in his discussions of
sovereignty, the juris publici doctrine, and the like. The result is a
comprehensive view of how the antebellum American judiciary lay the
foundations of public rights doctrines generally.136 As to specific areas of
regulation in which the police power was deployed, no one else has
successfully undertaken this kind of deep probe into exemplary areas of
regulatory activity, and into what judicial review in these specific areas tells
us about the values and priorities of governance and law in that era.,3 7 For
each of the areas of law he explores, Novak offers evidence of how the claims
of public rights were advanced and implemented, setting forth lucidly the
rationales that lawyers advanced and judicial opinions expressed on the validity
of regulatory ordinances and statutes. He illustrates for each of the areas that
he covers in depth the often startling degree to which minutiae of social and
economic behavior were subject to regulation. Not only was the police power
in action extremely broad in reach, but it also, he contends, amounted to
"intense regulation and public monitoring."' 13' As I will suggest below, I
think that this notion of "intense" regulation, as well as the allied claim of
intense (and presumably effective) "monitoring" of private activity, is probably
inaccurate. Novak's view on this score runs counter to much of what we know
with a fair measure of certainty about how regulation actually worked in
antebellum American communities generally, and in the rural areas occupied
conduct," id., which I, at least, find more accessible and meaningful as an indicator of institutions, how
they operated, and what their operations say to us about the premises of the society that acted through
government to define and achieve policy aims and to articulate legal rules. This issue need not detain us
here, however; to me it seems important only to the rhetoric, not the substance, of Novak's thesis.
136. Novak's argument fails, however, to include some older works that might have provided
significant additional material for a reconstruction of the intellectual and jurisprudential history of both the
antebellum era and the transition to what Novak terms the "new paradigm" after 1877. See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH
DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: 1606-1865 (1946); HOWARD JAY GRAIIAM,
EVERYMAN'S CONSTrUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY
THEORY", AND AMERICAN CONSTITIONALISM (1968); Henry Steele Commager, Constitutional History
and the Higher Law, in THE CONTrTUTON RECONSIDERED 225 (Conyers Read ed., 1938); J.A.C. Grant,
The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67 (1931); Walton H.
Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED, supra, at 167
(contending that the briefs of Counsel John Archibald Campbell in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873), announced the jurisprudential foundation of a new paradigm in constitutional
law-exactly the point that Novak seeks to make himself, see NOVAK, supra note 4, at 231-33 (likewise
citing the Campbell briefs).
137. See supra notes 7-28 and accompanying text (discussing the subjects covered in the chapters
devoted to specific areas of law).
138. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 14.
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by over three fourths of the population in particular.'39
In any event, Novak reaches the following conclusion from the evidence
he has gathered so industriously and analyzed to our great profit: "Private
rights were relative; public rights were absolute.""' What a contrast (or so
it appears, at first glance) with the quotation at the beginning of this Book
Review, taken from Willard Hurst, that "[p]roductivity was the central test and
validating canon."''
The contrast may not be as great as it seems at first blush, however, if we
recognize that regulatory powers affecting economic relationships can be and
have been mobilized to advance the cause of productivity and material
growth-and, in a variety of contexts, to support policies that advantage one
group or class at the expense of another. Moreover, despite the juridical
pronouncements declaring private rights to be contingent and the claims of the
public to be "absolute" (as Novak puts it), it is extremely difficult for me to
accept the idea that any of these competing canons was "absolute" from the
1790s to 1877 while the others were subordinate. 42 I am likewise convinced
that one can identify no single pattern with respect to outcomes. The correct
identification of winners and losers has been a central issue in debates among
legal historians concerned with the impact of law upon society. Some scholars
contend that legal institutions operated exploitatively to advance industrial or
other economic interests;'43 others believe that vested rights prescriptions
prevailed;' 44 and now comes Novak, who argues that the public rights
doctrine and notions of overriding community interests were uniformly
dominant.1 45 My own view is that the law defined priorities and trenched on
private rights, curbing entrepreneurial liberty in a complex pattern of tension
among several guiding principles or doctrinal traditions-vested rights,
pragmatic pursuit of material growth, and public rights. The public rights
doctrine was variously developed in eminent domain, taxation, public trust, and
police power jurisprudence and was expressed in communal claims that
139. Nearly all of Novak's examples of regulatory legislation in the public health area. for example.
concern municipal law. See, e.g., id. at 55 (stressing fire as a danger in towns and cities, where 'fire's
menace was no longer symbolized by the ignition of an isolated barn"). The same is true with respect to
his discussion of measures to protect against fire or its spread. See. e.g.. id. at 79 (discussing the legal
response to fire in New York City and the ways this response revealed "how interconnected people's lives
were in early American cities"). And he explicitly addresses many of the regulatory issues he covers as
issues of urban governance. See. e.g., id. at 83-113 (discussing urban market regulation); id. at 95-105
(discussing "The Urban Marketplace").
140. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
141. HURST, supra note 1, at 172; see supra text accompanying note I.
142. See Scheiber, Doctrinal Legacies, supra note 56; see also Howard Gillman. The Antmomy of
Public Purposes and Private Rights in the American Constitutional Tradition. or Why Communitanantsm
Is Not Necessarily Exogenous to Liberal Constitutionalism. 21 L & SOC. INQUIRY 67 (1996).
143. See HORWITZ, supra note 3.
144. See Corwin, supra note 22.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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reflected inherited principles of social organization associated with a less
ruthlessly commercialized market environment)
4 6
My caveats regarding Novak's argument that "public rights were absolute"
are based primarily on a reading of federal and state decisions that endorsed
the whole range of competing doctrines that I have mentioned. Some
reservations, however, also flow from the inadequacy of the data with respect
to actual enforcement practices. There is, to be sure, scattered rhetorical
evidence that enforcement was sometimes heavy-handed and that
administrative discretion may have been much broader and more robust than
scholars have ordinarily recognized. Particularly intriguing, in this regard, is
Novak's citation of a complaint by the New York Shipowner's Association in
1865 that the local health officer was "'clothed with more power than the
President of the United States."",147 Novak also quotes a commentator who
contended that the declaration of a quarantine "'has been well compared to a
declaration of war.""' t48 The interests that administrative regulation adversely
affected are not necessarily the most reliable sources of judgment about the
character and implementation of the rules at issue, but these voices need to be
considered. Moreover, similar expressions of outrage about allegedly arbitrary
decisions by public officials exercising their authority in operating the public
works abound in the records of the canal agencies and in petitions for redress
against discretionary policies opposed by local communities or functional
interest groups because they were economically disadvantaged by them. 
49
Of course, in operating a transportation enterprise the state had no choice but
to adopt detailed rules and regulations, and failure to enforce them would have
brought traffic to a halt, caused expensive damage, or created chaos. Hence it
is entirely unremarkable that in 1846 New York's codification of its canal
regulations comprised 500 separate provisions in a 129-page statute book. 50
A more challenging historical question (and one that we must confront
without much hard evidence) is whether other types of regulatory laws were
146. See supra notes 30-61 and accompanying text. See generally Pisani, supra note 72; Harry N.
Scheiber, Law and the Imperatives of Progress: Private Rights and Public Values in American Legal
History, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 303 (1982); Scheiber, Public Rights, supra
note 6. But see Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal
System of the Early American Republic, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1135 (advocating anew much of the vested
rights interpretation of the main constitutional law tradition).
147. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 211 (citing JOHN DUFFY, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK
CITY, 1625-1866, at 353 (1968)).
148. Id. (quoting Blewett Harrison Lee, Limitations Imposed by the Federal Constitution on the Right
of the States to Enact Quarantine Laws, 2 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1889)).
149. A significant portion of the archival records of the Ohio canal commissioners, to cite a body of
evidence in governmental administration that is most familiar to me, involved complaints of precisely this
sort. The rhetoric of public interest, the public good, the commonwealth ideal, and the like, was almost
invariably present. As I note below, the rhetoric of equal rights was also regularly mobilized. See infra note
177; see also HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE
ECONOMY, 1820-1861, at 88-93 (1968) (arguing that egalitarian doctrine provided a rhetorical imperative
for equal treatment of all regions and interests by expanding public investment in transport).
150. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 120.
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enforced faithfully and rigorously. We know with certainty that in some fields
of nineteenth-century American governance not addressed in Novak's work,
governmental institutions proved largely incapable of dealing with private
interest pressures: The private sector outran the public sector in its command
of expertise, information, and influence. A prime example lies in the history
of how the railroad companies artfully mobilized public subsidies and obtained
extraordinary corporate privileges (including the eminent domain power) yet
successfully resisted most of the manifold efforts to impose meaningful public
regulations upon them for fifty years.' 5 ' Public agencies were beset with
problems derived from office holders' blatant conflicts of interest or from
office holders' failure even to recognize the concept of conflict of interest. 52
In the administration of national and state land laws, for example, the record
fully bears out M.I. Ostrogorski's much-quoted observation that everywhere
in America "the spring of government [was] weakened or warped."'153 From
a detailed investigation of one major agricultural and industrial state's
management of its state lands prior to 1860, for instance, there seemed
abundant reason to conclude that "[fqailure to develop an internally consistent,
well-ordered land disposal policy was more than matched by a faithless
administration ... and a scenario of understaffing, corruption, and widespread
evasion of the law."' This finding is consistent with Hurst's thesis that
legislative and administrative operations of nineteenth-century government
demonstrated a lack of independent energy, a serious degree of bureaucratic
incompetence, and an inability to pursue long-term goals that transcended the
responses to immediate pressures.'"
151. On the subject of regulatory efforts, see GEORGE H MILLER. RAILROADS AD THE GRANGER
LAWS 42-58 (1971); David Maldwyn Ellis, Rivalr' Between the New York Central and rte Erte Canal. 29
N.Y. HIST. 268, 271, 275-76 (1948); and Frederick Merk. Eastern Antecedents ofthe Grangers. 23 AGRIC
HIST. 1 (1949). On subsidies, see generally CARTER GOODRICH. GOVER' MEIN"T PRO',tOTO, OF AMERIC%.,,
CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890 (1960). Local government grants of cash and stock mctments in
railroad corporations caused a widespread crisis in municipal finance in the 1860s. %%hen numerous
companies that had received such aid failed to build the promised linecs or fell into bankruptcy. resulting
in the great wave of railroad bond-aid cases before the Supreme Court See I CIIARLES FAIRtA".
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 918-1116 (1971) (Vol IV of Oliver Wendell Holimes De.ise
History of the Supreme Court (Paul A. Freund ed ))
152. For an example of the dim line between private and public interest in the actiltics of officials
in midwestern state canal finance administration, see Harry N Schetber. Public Canal Finance and State
Banking in Ohio, 1825-1837, 65 IND. MAG. HIST. 119. 128-31 (1969) Ihereinafter Scheiber. Public Canal
Finance]. On administrative incompetence in the administration and sale of a state's public land. see Harry
N. Scheiber, Land Reform. Speculation. and Governmental Failure- The Administtration of Ohio's State
Canal Lands, 1836-60, 7 PROLOGUE: J. NAT'L ARCHIVES 85. 85-98 (1975) (hereinafter Scheibcr. Land
Reform]. The question of the national government's competence and autonom) during the post-Civil War
era is considered on a broad canvas in STEPHEN SKOWRONEK. BUILDING A NE, AIERICA", STATE- THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES. 1877-1920 (1982). See also Scheiber. Federalism.
supra note 70, at 88-89, 113-17 (discussing the relationship of federal structure and dynamics to
administrative weakness at both the national and state governmental levels)
153. 2 M.I. OSTROGORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORGAI7ATIO\ OF POLITICAL PARTIES 550
(Frederick Clarke trans., 1922) (1902).
154. Scheiber, Land Reform, supra note 152. at 85
155. See HURST, supra note I, at 227-31.
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Such administrative underdevelopment and laxity often prevailed, despite
some triumphs of public entrepreneurship, largely because government did not
command adequate funding. This lack of funding stemmed from strong public
resistance to taxation at levels above two to four percent of national
income. 156 Such resistance to taxation is itself a telling piece of evidence
about the strength of antigovemmental and individualistic legal culture. If
society had such a powerful commitment to the interests of community and the
public weal, why the unwillingness to give the public sector sufficient
resources to act more effectively? Is it possible that a similar kind of laxness
or incompetence might have characterized some-or even a large part-of the
regulatory regime that comprised the real boundaries of the police power in
that era? Or that even where some appellate cases do appear to indicate that
enforcement was being undertaken, we might be seeing only exceptions to a
more general pattern of laxness in translating law on the books into regulatory
reality?
This last possibility seems especially apposite since some distinguished
writers on that era's legal development, such as Lawrence Friedman, have
contended that in actuality "the scope and administrative strength of regulation
were limited."'157 Many of the programs enacted for the regulation of markets
and commodity inspection "probably never lived except on paper" in the
western states and perhaps in many of the older, settled areas as well.'
Many of the regulations, moreover, were designed to be privately enforced,
rather than overseen through detailed "monitoring" and enforcement by public
officials. In these instances especially, the evidence of successful enforcement
through private action might very well represent an exception to the norm.'
59
156. For data on government revenues and expenditures in relation to national product, see Lance E.
Davis & John Legler, The Government in the American Economy, 1815-1902: A Quantitative Study, 26 J.
ECON. HIsT. 514 (1966); and Paul B. Trescott, The U.S. Government and National Income, 1790.1860, in
TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 337, 342-43 (National Bureau Econ.
Research ed., 1960). The record of the antebellum state governments in building complex canal systems
(on a scale that exceeded any other public enterprise except perhaps the military buildups and operations
during wartime) varied from superb to catastrophic. See generally GOODRICH, supra note 151. For
differences in the quality of performance in the first phase and later phases of Ohio Canal policy and
administration, see, for example, SCHEMER, supra note 149, at 61-80, 120-33, 297-306. The breakdown
of rational planning, probity of administration, and efficiency in Ohio is a particularly telling piece of
evidence since this was undoubtedly one of the strongest states in the antebellum era in terms of
administrative competence in state-level governance. See id. passim (providing a general discussion of
government's role in the antebellum economy); see also GEORGE ROGERs TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION
REVOLUTION, 1815-1860, at 32-55 (1951) (providing an authoritative, brief survey of the canal projects);
Harry N. Scheiber & Stephen Salsbury, Reflections on George Rogers Taylor's The Transportation
Revolution, 1815-1860: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospect, 51 BUs. HIsT. REV. 79 (1977) (discussing Taylor's
analysis of government investment and operations in the U.S. transport sector prior to 1860 and its
relationship to the larger context of interventionist and laissez faire aspects of policy).
157. FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 165.
158. Id. at 165.
159. See id. at 165. The claim of "public monitoring" is Novak's. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 14. James
Ely, like Friedman, contends that detailed regulation of markets and sales came under heavy attack by
merchants and artisans rallying to the banner of economic "liberty" and their rights as citizens. See ELY,
supra note 48, at 22-23. Furthermore, "regulatory bodies were feeble, and enforcement often lax." Id. at
[Vol. 107: 823
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Novak confronts this issue directly and with great candor, but his handling
of the data shortfall problem' 60 is not entirely satisfying. He concedes, for
example, that some of the detailed market regulations upon which he relied
heavily (e.g., New York's marketing statutes) came under political attack and
were actually repealed for a considerable period of time. 16' He is also fully
aware of the evidence in writings by Hurst, Hartog, and others that public
regulatory officials failed dramatically in some instances, conceding that "[al
convincing challenge to pervasive nyths of lax law enforcement . . . requires
a deeper investigation of prosecution, litigation, and local governance. '16
It is not at all clear why Novak should dismiss so casually as "myths" the
evidence other scholars have found showing enforcement laxness. He does
make several arguments for the proposition that his book successfully refutes
those so-called "myths." The most persuasive is the thesis that every court case
examined by him concretely involved a regulation "that was distinctly
enforced,"'163 and that taken as a whole, these cases "are but the tip of the
iceberg in an extensive (and sometimes hidden) legal history of
enforcement."' ' This idea, it seems to me, is an imponderable of
62. Ely points out that the regulations that were imposed seem to a modem commentator "modest" at best.
"typically piecemeal and directed against specific problems," and generally not redistrbutive in impact or
intent. Id.
160. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 273 n.46; see also infra note 164 (providing details of Novak's
discussion).
161. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 288 n.32.
162. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 274 n.46.
164. Id. Novak offers three other arguments to counter what he admits is an "'overvhelming emphasis
[in the literature] on legal, regulatory failure and concomitant . .. lax enforcement * ld First. he contends
that even "statistically anomalous" cases can be accurate indicators of important aspects of legal culture
(even if not accurate as to where enforcement resources are being directed). This argument. however.
simply ignores the realities of enforcement. He cites the modem case of Bowers i: Hardvwick. 478 U.S. 186
(1986), as an example of how an anomalous case should be viewed because it is "ideologically powerful "
NOVAK, supra note 4, at 274 n.46. There is no gainsaying that Bowers is an important piece of evidence
for an investigator of "law, sexuality, and the policing of morality in late twentieth-century American life."
id., but simply to say that the case is important is not enough. On the contrary, the case must be viewed
in light of what the statistics (which define its anomalous status) tell us about the larger pattern of
ideological, moral, and enforcement norms. Furthermore. the opinion's rhetorical and substantive content
must be placed in jurisprudential context, alongside judicial and legal sources that arc expressing very
different views.
Second, Novak contends that "100 per cent effectiveness is rarely anticipated in human laws" Id. No
one will contradict this position, but there is still the hard question: What percentage is at issue when we
seek to measure the level at which particular laws are in fact effective? (Exemplary works that grapple with
this issue include MORRIS, supra note 5; and David H. Flaherty. Law and the Enforcement of Morals in
Early America. in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 203 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn c... 1971)). My
own conclusion in investigations of law and the economy, including public nghts and police power
questions, has been that there is a tension among competing ideologies and norms. This conclusion leaves
me open to the criticism that I duck the hard question of which norm was actually dominant. My response
is that there is no iron rule in history that a given norm is manifestly dominant in any sphere or in any
period. Even when a scholar as careful as Hurst concluded that material growth and its requirements were
largely controlling in law that sought "release of energy." he was at pains to stress that there was a
counterpoint of public rights doctrine and practice in the law and that constitutional norms of responsibility
and accountability were often imposed by the courts. See HURST. supra note 37. at 45-46. 223-24. HURST.
supra note 51, at 19-22, 39-50.
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considerable magnitude.
The "iceberg" included, first of all, the vast majority of the population that
was engaged in agriculture early in the century. In 1820, nearly eight out of
ten workers were in the agricultural sector, either as proprietors or as rural
laborers; in 1840, the proportion was still as high as sixty-three percent. 65
Although the marketing of agricultural products came under government
regulation in a variety of ways that historians have long explicitly
recognized, 166 the day-to-day work and economic transactions of this large
majority of the population were largely untroubled by government supervision
or regulation of any substantial kind. 167 Thus Novak's claim that "[1licensing
left little in the early American economy untouched"'' 6 1 seems inconsistent
with the evidence.
The "iceberg" also included other large areas of economic and social
behavior that were largely left alone by government-because public officials
did not act on their writs of authority, because many rules left to private
enforcement were dead letters, and perhaps in some instances because of actual
resistance to enforcement. Occasionally, such resistance was violent. One
example of private coercion lies in the history of the "claims
clubs"--organizations of squatters on public lands, who would join together
Novak's third argument is a practical one: the contention, to which no scholar who has worked with
19th-century records will object, that "records are inadequate for making a case for or against enforcement."
NOVAK, supra note 4, at 274 n.46. Yet in light of this concession, Novak's insistence that public rights
were "absolute" and that enforcement officials provided detailed "monitoring" are manifestly implausible.
165. See Stanley Lebergott, Labor Force and Employment, 1800-1960, in 30 OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT,
AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1800: STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH 117, 119 tbl.
(National Bureau Econ. Research ed., 1966). In U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 74 (1960), the estimates given are even higher for the
proportion engaged in agriculture. The statistics include slaves as well as free workers in the estimates of
sectoral proportions. See id.
166. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 48, at 20-22.
167. Given the lack of any evidence to the contrary in the vast scholarly literatures on either rural life
or economic development in the antebellum economy, I would contend that the burden falls on any
commentator who would claim that agricultural activity was comprehensively under regulation. As noted
above, see supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text, even many of the marketing regulations that were
on the books were apparently administered with considerable laxity, if at all. In some years of research on
rural-sector activities associated with the canal projects, I have found evidence of extraordinarily detailed
and heavy-handed interventionist policies to shape development that canal authorities exercised in
establishing rate schedules on a "mercantilistic" basis that favored in-state producers and merchants at the
expense of outsiders. See SCHEIBER, supra note 149, at 247-681. This was in contrast, however, to a
virtually complete absence in the records and correspondence of farm interests-and even millers and other
processing entrepreneurs-of mention of any kind of regulation that significantly controlled their day-to-day
manufacturing or farming activities.
168. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 7. If Novak's argument were that these activities demonstrably did come
under a licensing regime (or, for that matter, were in other ways vitally affected by interventionist policies
in the public interest), that would be a very different, and much more plausible, kind of contention than
one claiming little was left "untouched" or outside the regulatory sphere in essential ways.
Apposite here is Hurst's sage admonition that "Legal History needs to come to terms with the fact
that legal processes had more involvement with some institutions than with others." HURST, supra note 37,
at 55. Specific evidence of how this admonition can provide insight into complex patterns of intervention
and nonintervention was succinctly provided in a classic article. See Carter Goodrich, State In, State Out:
A Pattern of Development Policy, 2 J. ECON. ISSUES 365 (1968).
19971 Private Rights and Public Power
at first auctions, when purchases and acquisition of title became possible for
the first time, to intimidate any outsiders who might be interested in bidding
on the tracts that they occupied. 6 9 A similar phenomenon occurred in the
early mining communities of the Far West, in which the first arrivals
established their own property rules and then enforced their claims by force
against challengers.'70 These last examples are particularly intriguing because
the claims clubs and miners' organizations can be portrayed with equal
plausibility as either (1) examples of deeply rooted collectivist ideals and
communal and anticommercial values in action; or (2) exemplary of a cynical
mobilization of coercive power by a first-arrived special interest group of
expectant capitalists, pursuing naked self-interest under the banner of social
justice.
We also have good documentation of dramatic instances in which reliance
on the police power and on legal definitions of community "'rights" and
interests yielded to angry mob action against state or private property. In Ohio,
169. See Allan G. Bogue, The Iowa Claims Clubs- Symbol & Substance. 45 MISS VAu.Y li-lsT Rie'
231 (1958); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 83. at 206-07 (discussing how the effccttie bypassing of the
formal legal framework for rulemaking, as accompltshed by the claims clubs. was one aspect of a larger
pattern in which the legislature and courts had to confront the realities of political povvcr and pnate
lawmaking).
170. The miners' claims have been assessed by some commentators as a benign and creatise
rulemaking device, by others as bespeaking privatism at its worst Thus to one legal scholar they amounted
to a "chaos of casual individual initiative and insistent competing claims " Joseph Bingham. Some
Suggestions Concerning the California Law ofRipartan Rights. ti LEGAL ESSAN S t\ TRIt m TO ORi% Kip
MCMURRY 7, 8 (Max Radin & A.M. Kidd eds.. 1935) To a prominent early hisionan of the Anglo-
American occupation of California, however, the mmers" claims 'vere eidence of "IsiturdN self-reliance,
mingled and tempered with a high appreciation of one's dependence upon others, the pocr to stand alone.
[and] the power to organize." CHARLES HOWARD SHINN. MINING CAMPS A ST. D 1 t% A't-.RiC'A\
FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 275-76 (Alfred A. Knopf 1948) (1884)
Justice Field, who had been on the California bench during the Gold Rush. declared from the high
Court many years later that the miners' code was evidence of "lose of order and s) stem and of fair dealing
which are the prominent characteristics of our people.... land in this instance creating rules) so framed
as to secure all comers, within practicable limits, absolute equality of right and pn ilege - Jennison % Kirk.
98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878). Charles McCurdy's scholarship on early California resource jurisprudence casts
in a brilliant analytic light the complexities faced by the state's high court in tr)ing to maintain a rule of
law ideal against the shifting definition of priorities by the legislature and the force of the miners' codes
See McCurdy, supra note 70. On how the balance between egalitarianism and property -rights-mindedness
became even more complicated by racism and a variety of brands of "radicalism"-some of wshich vsould
be admired by historians who like to find in the 19th century the histoncal foundations of class
consciousness and conflict, but many of which embarrass such a quest for historic continuity and
legitimacy-see the discussion of the historiography in Scheiber. Public Economic Polic%. supra note 72.
at 1169-72. Cf Harry N. Scheiber, The Frontier and Legal Cultr Market Values o the Overland Trail.
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1209 (1982) (reviewing JOHN PHILLIP REID. LAw FOR THE ELEpHA'"r PROPE~RTY AD
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980)). See generalh* REID. supra (discussing informal
arrangements on the wagon trains on the Oregon Trail and the California overland routes. and v hat they
tell us about freedom of contract, individual responsibility and its legal limits, coercion, and other key
features of mid-19th-century legal culture). Reid brilliantly uses the eidence of beha ior in these "convo) "
communities, moving across the landscape on their own resources and constructing their ovsn rules, as a
laboratory test for generalizations such as those that Hurst. Cors m. and others hase vanously advanced
as to the basic tenets of law that represented some kind of core or consensus, at least among the franchised
classes. For a history of extralegal coercive incidents and mov ements painted on a broad historical canvas.
see RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE HiSTORICAL STUDIES Oi AItRICA
, VIOLENCE
AND VIGILANTISM (1975).
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for example, when a giant reservoir was built in Mercer County in 1844 to
supply the northern line of the Miami Canal, one of the state's major public
works, local residents demanded that all timber be cleared from the flood area
in order to avoid public health hazards.' The legislature responded with an
act requiring the canal administrators to clear the trees, but the directive was
ignored (no "precise monitoring" here). The local populace then addressed the
problem itself, forming a mob that breached the banks of the reservoir and
drained it themselves. A criminal action was filed against the perpetrators, but
a grand jury quickly cleared them-an example of the jury as independent
judge of law's legitimacy, a recurring problem in the history of American legal
culture that has assumed new importance today in a racial context.
72
Another well-known episode concerned the highly effective way in which
farmers on an early Michigan railroad line in the 1850s took care of the
inadequate fencing that had led to devastation of their livestock. 73 Were the
mobs formed to destroy railroad property evidence of a breakdown of law or
instead a manifestation of a fringe area (nonetheless one considered within the
legitimate boundaries of legal behavior) in the legal culture of the day?
174
It is not my purpose to argue here that Novak's position is extravagantly
wrong, but rather to suggest that here, as with the argument that courts treated
public rights as "absolute," even one who warmly welcomes scholarship that
takes public rights seriously (as I do) would prefer an approach that is less
dismissive of complexity and tension in the law or in the legal culture.'
75
171. The Mercer County incident is fully documented in SCHEIMER, supra note 149, at 174-75.
172. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
173. See CHARLES HIRSCHFELD, THE GREAT RAILROAD CONSPIRACY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF A
RAILROAD WAR (1953).
174. The legitimacy of mob action in specific circumstances as part of the European heritage
manifested in colonial America is explored in the classic study, Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings and Civil
Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. (n.s.) 3 (1970). I have not dwelt here on
other examples of mob actions, for example actions against abolitionists, Asian immigrants in the Par West,
the Irish in Boston, the Mormons, or mine owners and managers. They represent a significant part of the
story of how "well-regulated" the society actually was, who was counted "in" and who "out" in defining
community and enjoying its collective protection through law, and how effectively the law was actually
mobilized in dealing with such incidents and movements. Specific citations to individual writings do not
seem required in this context, but most of the literature is cited and discussed in BROWN, supra note 170.
175. These criticisms further suggest that a full comprehension of the "well-ordered society" requires
an inquiry into how that society maintains order-an inquiry, in other words, into mob control, criminal
justice administration, and the basic "night watchman" functions more generally. Novak's inquiry deals with
public safety in narrower and more exclusive terms, which I think created an unfortunate omission. This
omission is understandable enough in light of his having worked through more than a thousand appellate
cases and dug into the facts that had led to their initiation in trial court, and in light of his mastery of a
large part of the enormous relevant literature, but it weakens the force of the book nonetheless.
An outstanding work in the growing and rich literature on subjects omitted by Novak is the California
study, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870-1910 (1981), which is not listed in Novak's
bibliography and apparently not cited by him. The Friedman and Percival study has important lessons for
historians who would generalize about legal culture and the identification of norms in legal behavior, as
derived from the evidence of trial dockets and patterns of decision. I think that the application of some of
these lessons in the course of Novak's analysis--especially as to the weight that one ought to give to
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The complexities suggested by the history of the claims clubs and related
phenomena have parallels in the task of interpreting specific judicial decisions
and patterns of regulatory action and inaction. For example, what is one to
conclude about the significance for our portrayal of "governance" and legal
culture in the nineteenth century of a tale-told recently in a brilliant article
by Harry Watson176 -of yeoman farmers (many reliant on fishing for
subsistence) in the Carolina country, who waged a long campaign to stop the
construction of dams that impeded fish migration? The language of their
petitions and the arguments of their advocates mobilized in full force the
rhetoric of traditional rights, the common law tradition of public waters and
fisheries, and communal claims cast in the language of egalitarianism and
republicanism. 177 They failed to obtain redress to the extent they demanded,
though if we credit the importance of "discourse" itself as evidence of legal
culture and competing values, the communal rights argument must be
recognized as significant. In the end, however, the fish stocks were depleted
and the subsistence fishery largely destroyed. "Precommercial" republican
values failed to prevail, and commercial fishing operations downstream,
exploiting the resource without self-restraint and successfully resisting effective
public regulation, were largely responsible for that outcome.""
It can probably be said, then, that the resilience and triumph of the fabled
individualism of those who engaged in commercial fishing downstream, a
juridical rhetoric and to cases that may or may not be typical of a larger paitern-would hase added a
valuable dimension to his study.
176. See Watson, supra note 82.
177. As I have already observed, see supra text accompanying note 125. Novak might hasc addressed
more fully the problem of how the ideal of equality was related to the police power and the legal culture
that it expressed and supported. The history that Watson writes in his Carolina study emphasizes that the
rhetoric of egalitarianism was an integral part of the ideology of republicanism and had a moral force that
gave it special significance in the process of mobilizing demands on the legal system See Watson. supra
note 82, at 17-24, 28-32.
Equally relevant evidence comes from the sphere of promotuse action, especially in popular demands
for transport investments (internal improvements, as they were then called) b) the state and federal
governments alike. Elsewhere I have argued that the demands for "'equal benefits" in the distribution of
transport lines through public investment was so consistently voiced that one could reasonably term it
doctrinal. As a doctrine, moreover, it was important in political argumentation as a force counterpoised
against two competing theories of government action: (I) the 'commonwealth" conception that generally
warranted interventionism by the positive state: and (2) the theory of systematic planning and ordering of
growth through state intervention, informed by engineering expertise and involving the application of cost-
benefit analysis in laying canal lines or chartering private transportation companies In one sense, of course.
resorting to egalitarian doctrinal ideas was a way by which Americans elevated their quest for localized
advantage to the status of political principle. See SCIEMER. supra note 149. at 91. 355-56. see also
FORREST G. HILL, ROADS, RAILS, AND WATERWAYS: T14E ARMY ENGINE-ERS AND EARLY TRA SPORrATIO%
(1957) (discussing comparable pressures on the national government to conform to egalitanan imperatives
by distributing largess for transport investment). The "commonwealth" conception invoked the common
good, or "common weal" in the classical language of English common law and political philosophy, to
serve as the validating principle for legislation and judicial decistons that subordinated the self-interested
claims of individuals in favor of the society's larger communal needs See HADU% & HA'NDLIt. supra
note 101; LEVY, supra note 5; Lively, supra note 72: see also Wiley E Hodges. Prm-Gorernmentahsm in
Virginia, 1789-1836: A Pragmatic Liberal Pattern in the Political Heritage. 25 J POL 333 (1963)
(complementing the commonwealth approach in a largely neglected but excellent study)
178. See Watson, supra note 82. at 36-41.
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powerful and atomistic economic individualism, are the elements in this story
that are most revealing about American "governance" and legal culture-at
least in that part of the country, at that time. The legislature found itself
confronted on the one hand with claims from the yeomen and subsistence
fishing interests that the "common good" and traditional rights dictated
protection of their fisheries and, on the other, with the commercial companies'
claims of rights to economic liberty and free enterprise. The latter successfully
countered the yeomanry's arguments by contending that the free marketplace
"served a much wider public than the inhabitants of any particular stream
bank,"' 179 so that the communal good was best served by unregulated access
to the resource and a freedom of contract regime: "[lit was easy to argue...
that the market should therefore have privileged access to the fish that God had
sent to men in general."'' 0 The slogan of "republican equality" thus had cut
both ways, and so the legislature, stymied, adopted a limited policy of
regulation that treated all interests alike, thereby effectively advantaging the
commercial enterprises. The old communal fishing rights were allowed to
wither, the commercial enterprises were not brought under effective regulation,
the pretense that all interests were being treated equally was sustained, and in
the end the resource itself fell victim to an entrepreneurial imperative clothed
in egalitarian rhetoric.' 8'
To take a similar example of complexities that inhere in concrete
examples, consider the much-cited early New York waterways case People v.
Platt.5 2 The court in Platt struck down as unconstitutional statutes that did
not compensate land owners for the removal of dams that were interfering with
salmon, though the harvesting of this important food resource was claimed to
be a traditional communal right on the Saranac. 8 3 The court guarded
carefully against any inference that its decision called into question "the power
or supremacy of the legislature, to legislate for general and public purposes,
179. Id. at 41.
180. Id.
181. See id. Watson argues that this occurred partly because no one understood the biology of the
fishery. But in later periods of regulatory history, when scientific research on fisheries biology and
management was more advanced and state agencies maintained laboratory programs, the policy process
remained muddled, if for no other reason than that often the scientific disagreement about the biology
created a paralysis of will that allowed fishing interests to prevail. See, e.g., ARTHUR McEVoy, TtIE
FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM 221-33 (1986); Margaret Beattie Bogue, To Save the Fish: Canada, the United
States, the Great Lakes, and the Joint Commission of 1892, 79 J. AM. HIST. 1429 (1993); Harry N.
Scheiber, Pacific Ocean Resources, Science, and Law of the Sea: lVilbert M. Chapman and the Pacific
Fisheries, 1945-1970, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381 (1986). There were comparable disagreements among experts
in 19th-century promotional policy, as is evident, for example, from the history of the canal enterprises of
the states. Sometimes the special interests, including local and functional economic interest groups, simply
overwhelmed the process. See GOODRICH, supra note 151, at 230-62; LOUIS B. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY
AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860, at 9-17 (1948) (concerning the force of
localism).
182. 17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
183. See id. at 215.
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promotive of the public good, when acting within the pale of the
constitution."'' 84 Because the river had never been navigable and so was juris
privati in the common law classification set forth by Lord Hale,""
compensation was owed if dams were to be removed. What later came to be
known as inverse condemnation doctrine restrained the discretion of the state
under the police power." 6 Is the significance of this case the outcome, which
placed a vitally important limit upon the police power and erected a bulwark
in defense of private, vested rights? Or is the case more significant for the
court's explicit recognition of regulatory authority in the legislature's
discretion-so long, of course, as such authority remained "within the pale of
the constitution"?
Thanks to Professor Novak's efforts, scholars will be able to wrestle with
such questions in a much richer historical and theoretical context than was
previously available.187 Even if he has not greatly extended the list of what
has for some years been regarded as the central line of cases that developed
police power doctrine in the realm of general jurisprudence, he has given those
cases a rich contextual setting. He has also vastly expanded the range of
evidence with which scholars must grapple in dealing with public rights, their
doctrinal development, and their significance for actual governance, unearthing
numerous decisions that he persuasively argues are of key importance to
doctrinal development in discrete policy areas.
I have difficulty, however, with Novak's enthusiastic characterizations of
the public rights doctrine as the "pervasive"'8 and "dominant"' 9 doctrine
in American law. I think it is more consistent with the overall record,
especially given what we know of the character of nineteenth-century contract,
tort, and labor relations law, to interpret the tradition instead as one of
continuous and creative tension between competing validating canons.'t 0
184. Id.
185. See supra text accompanying note 117.
186. See Scheiber, supra note 17, at 33740. Novak resisits these issues, in his book See NOVAK.
supra note 4, at 117-21, 13944.
187. One of the most interesting interpretive openings that Novak explores has to do with regional
differences in legal culture, an issue seldom addressed in the iterature until now. In an intensise, though
limited, research foray that compares the law of Louisiana (a cisil lay. junsdiction. as w~ell as a Southern
one) pertaining to levees and waterways generally with the law of Northern common lay. states. Nosak
finds a very great degree of commonality both as to policy and as to legal doctinne w ith respect to "'decpl,
rooted notions about public rights on public ways." NOVAK. supra note 4. at 137-42 For essays that
explore in the context of Southern regional history some of the major themes that hase been pur,,ued in
the study of 19th-century American legal history, see the essays on Southern history in AtIBIVALE.sT
LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOLrTH (James W. Ely & Dasid J. Bodenhamer. Ir cds. 1984)
[hereinafter AMBiVALENT LEGACY], especially Tony A. Freyer. Law and rie Antebellum Southern
Economy: An Interpretation, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra. at 49: and Lass rence M Friedman. The Last
Between the States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal Historv. in AMBI\ALE-'r LEGACY. supra. at 30
188. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 6.
189. Id. at 17.
190. See Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Libert" and the Constitution. in ESSAYS i% EIt HISTORY OF
LIBERTY 75 (Henry E. Huntington Library ed.. 1988)
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Novak says that his account is about "the public conditions of private
freedom."'' Whether we regard the counterpart "private freedom" element
in this history as harmful on balance in its social and political consequences
or see it instead as a salutary contribution of American law to the fulfillment
of important democratic ideals, it ought not to be unduly minimized or
rendered obscure. To do so is no more defensible than to allow the vested
rights model or other general interpretations to obscure (or oversimplify) the
complex dynamics of the public rights doctrine and its meaning for an
understanding of American governance. The judiciary that repeatedly
pronounced that the common good (and sometimes merely "the public
convenience"'192) could constitutionally justify requiring private property
rights to yield to public controls was the very same judiciary that so creatively
(and consistently) worked out the doctrine that private market transactions were
to be adjudged as having been concluded by individuals of equal bargaining
power competent to look to their own interests-that promoted, in other words,
a model of economic individualism and "freedom of contract" in a market-
defined world of social relationships.193 The same Massachusetts court that
assured the right of laborers to organize and act collectively as free individuals
in Commonwealth v. Hunt 94 only a short time later applied identical logic
in announcing the fellow servant doctrine that left so many common laborers
and even skilled workers at the mercy of fate in a dangerous workplace. 95
191. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 17.
192. City Council v. Goldsmith, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 428 (1844), quoted in NOVAK, supra note 4, at
101.
193. See LEVY, supra note 5, at 303-21; NELSON, supra note 17, at 136-44; see also GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (1974) (noting that in the 19th century, the freedom of contract theory
implied a "narrow scope of social duty" and summing up 19th-century freedom of contract theory with the
adage that "[n]o man is his brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take the hindmost");
KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 298 (1990)
(discussing the public interest and the police power as exceptions to fundamental constitutional rights of
individuals to contract freely).
The same style of judicial thought was exemplified by the individualistic, freedom of contract idea
that found expression in some leading police power decisions. For instance, in a landmark 1823 case the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a house owner had no right to compensation when a
municipal street regrading project undermined his home's foundations and made it inaccessible. "Every one
who purchases a lot upon the summit or on the decline of a hill," the court declared, "is presumed to
foresee the changes which public necessity or convenience require," and hence no compensation was
mandated. Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 418, 431 (1823); see also supra note 10 (discussing
Callender).
194. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) III (1842).
195. The infamous fellow servant decision was Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 45 Mass.
(4 Met.) 49 (1842), which invoked the assumption-of-risk and fellow servant rules to deny recovery to an
injured railroad employee on grounds that the worker's contract discounted the ordinary perils of the job
in question, and that the employer was at second remove from the act that caused injury. The reasoning
of this case, it should be noted, was founded on the same premises (or fictions) as others mentioned:
individualism, freedom of contract, and neutrality of marketplace institutions. See generally LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 301-02 (2d ed. 1985) (explaining Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's
reasoning in Farwell); TOMLINS, supra note 6, at 352-68. Of course, this same court also was responsible
for the most important state decision on the police power. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
53 (1851).
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Such anomalies and ironies abound in the record of law and the economy,
especially in the era of slavery' 9 6-an era also of unprecedentedly rapid
technological change and economic integration, and of successive new
challenges in the law to inherited doctrines and their premises.
197
At one point in his discussion of public health laws, Novak seems to
endorse (almost in passing) the interpretation that argues for a shifting pattern
of tensions among competing doctrines or ideologies. He avers there that in the
early nineteenth century "American public law was not univalent, holding true
to single externalist trajectories like 'nationalism,' 'commerce,' the 'release of
creative energy,' or the 'subsidization of economic growth.' Instead, it
encompassed a diverse set of legal and social priorities."' 9' It does not
detract much from the importance of his book that this passage is inconsistent
with the many occasions, elsewhere in the book, in which he seems to abandon
this view and insists instead on the appealing but probably incorrect idea that
the public rights doctrine was dominant and controlling. There is no question
in historical research more compelling for gaining perspective on the central
issues of our own day than that of how "the people's welfare" and the
"common good" have been defined and pursued in America, in what
relationship to rule of law, and with what results. '" Novak has enriched this
perspective with an ambitious research design, presented with admirable clarity
and verve.2 °
196. Slaveholding communities, of course, defined the "common good" in %%ays that should gi'e one
pause before celebrating too enthusiastically the public nghts idea in all its vanants
197. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 83: cf THOMAS D. MORRIS. SOLTriERN SLAVERY AND TIlE LAW.
1619-1860, at 103-31 (1996) (discussing the sale and mortgaging of slaves): id. at 337-53 (discussing police
regulations limiting slaveholders' absolute control over slaves).
198. NOVAK, supra note 4, at 214.
199. Id. at 239, 248.
200. Novak ends his account in 1877, arguing that by then the doctrines of privatism became
ascendant and the era of the "well-regulated society" was over. See id. at 24548 Whether this
periodization is justified will have to be judged by the evidence he presents in a promised successor
volume, and it will be interesting indeed to see how he works out the thesis. It seems premature now.
however, to deal with the issue on the basis of the very general assertions that he makes in this book about
the new order that came to prevail. To illustrate the paradigm shifts that he proposes to substantiate. Novak
includes a figure illustrating differences in "locus of authority." "preferred social unit of go emance."
"preferred method of governance," and "rule of law" for each of three penods (colonial. Revolution to
1870s, and 1870s to 20th century). Id. at 238 fig.2. Readers may find it instructive to compare a similar
figure, by Hurst, charting time shifts in public policy concerns and legal responses. See HuRST. supra note
30, at 40 fig.l.
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